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Levi, i
About Punctuation

So often the conventions of punctuation resist our attempts to express expression itself. For the sake
of clarity, I am laying out my conventions here. Double quotation marks are used only for quotations
and for direct speech. In speaking about words as words or phrases as phrases, I employ small capital
letters; and in speaking about words as signs, I mark them in small capital letters with the clarifying
superscript: SIGN. Sparingly I capitalize the first letter of a word to set it apart as philosophically charged;
and, when needed, emphasize the difference between a word in an ordinary or in a philosophically
charged context by underlining its capitalized or not capitalized first letter. Occasionally, I italicize
important or philosophically charged words, but mostly I will italicize in the usual fashion—for
emphasis. At times, too, I use single quotation marks for skeptical emphasis.
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Preface

There is a purpose, I promise, to the strange, unorthodox arrangement of this project. I find that
meaning is not the sort of thing that is straightforward. Rather, we encounter and develop meaning
(and our instincts for it) in multifold ways constantly. This project needs to be strange to effectively
get at meaning. If it were not strange, I am not sure it would be meaning.
I have cobbled a mosaic. I wish I could lay it out for you in glass pieces until we had panes to
view the world through, but I am still learning glasswork, and this is the best I have yet. So, these are
the fragments and tesserae that I have furnaced over the past four years carefully gathered together
for you into this kaleidoscope.
This mosaic I present to you comes out of the writing I have been doing over the past four
years. There is a utility to expressing my ideas in relief against another’s, in drawing out richness and
tension and connection. There is also a utility to speaking the way I want, leaving behind how other’s
ideas chafe against mine in favor of the salve of soliloquy. I aim to do both in this project: to converse
with the thinkers who shape me but also to shed the traditions that have no place in the life I want to
live.
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On Eager Tenterhooks*
Introduction
“If [words] prejudice philosophy, they contain philosophy.”1 Do they really prejudice? Yes, if words
shape, influence, and guide philosophy (which they do), then they also contain philosophy. However,
the word PREJUDICE implies that there is a pure practice possible. I do not think philosophy is possible
without words, so I do not understand why we would portray words as invasive to philosophy. They
cannot be removed. But this portrayal suggests an essence, or pure form of philosophy, that words do
invade, even as they mediate. The notion of pure philosophy is partly the product of the formalizing
instinct, which leans towards the singular and set. What I resist is how this formalizing instinct
arbitrarily prioritizes essences and pure forms in our examinations of language simply because essences
and pure forms are conveniently singular and set. What I seek is a tapestry of language and meaning
that is untethered from these presumptions. The challenge I am raising to the traditional approach lies
in its overwhelming preoccupation with plain language. I resist a dominant approach in philosophy of
language, which attempts to formalize language and prefers the singular and set. My resistance to this
approach, of course, does not mean I oppose close examination of language. I will weave my
assumptions throughout the project, so that hopefully we may view this tapestry of meaning when we
are finished.
So, now, let us talk about meaning. The noun MEANING and verb MEAN† (which I am regarding
as two embodiments of the same word) have a variety of uses in common speech. We find a painting
meaningful. We ask a partner if they really meant it when they said “I love you” for the first time by
accident. We check the meaning of an unknown word in the dictionary. But what do I mean by
MEANING? Throughout this project when I use MEANING and MEAN I am speaking commonly. While

I will develop a more detailed definition of

MEANING,

you should need to disregard the extant use of

there should be no part of this project where

MEANING

to understand my use of it. When I more

carefully define MEANING it will be to clarify, ratify, and unify how we already speak about meaning,
not to undermine or limit public use. I simply wish to call to attention the kinship between the various
contexts in which we speak of meaning, so that we do not isolate the painting from the partner or the

* My title plays on the idiom ON TENTERHOOKS, which suggests “a state of painful suspense” in reference to cloth
stretched and held in place by the hooks on tenter frames. Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “tenterhook, n.,”
March 2021, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/199236.
† At times I will also use the gerundive passive participle MEANING adjectivally or adverbially.
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partner from the dictionary. The meaning I am speaking of happens in art, literature, and comedy the
same as in arguments, blushes, gestures, and winks.
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Approach I

“The ships hung in the sky in much the same way that bricks don’t.”2 (As strange as it is to speak this
way, it is apt. We understand it perfectly.) So too, meaning and language course along in much the
same way that most else doesn’t. The marvel of meaning and language—that sound waves, ink, and
all our other methods actually give us a world beyond atomic matter—is the only faith I have. Just as
the marvel that atoms cling across empty space and give me form is the only faith I have. These are
the same faith. It is faith that I cannot bear to doubt.
Approach II
And this faith comes only when we let it—when we let ourselves be ourselves, speak with ourselves
and each other the way we would, the way we want to. I seek a certain clarity but more so a certain
faith. Because when I spend my time over-enunciating and tiptoeing through careful syntax, syntax
and enunciation appear the defining parts, rather than what I am doing with them and through them.
If I talk to you the way I would talk to someone, the way I would speak in poetry, in laughter, in prose
– if I speak to you how I wish to, I trust you will understand. I cannot bear to not trust. But even if
and when you do not understand, mine will not be vain trust.
Ours will not be vain trust. Please test your faith as I test my weight on mine. Test your faith
with me and trust that we succeed even when we worry we may not. Perhaps we do not need to obsess
so mightily over the accuracy we cling to in fear. Ask me questions and I will answer, and somewhere
through conversation we will reach an understanding, I hope. And I think what we need right now is
the faith that we may speak together and ask and answer, and all we know and rely upon will not
crumble as yet we anticipate reaching our synthesis.
It is faith I am trying to instill in us, so I will talk in the ways that prove faith is warranted: in
the ways that are not so clear that we come to look mostly at syntax. I will speak in the ways that feel
as intuitive as inhalation and as much your birthright as breath.
Approach III
Remember this is a conversation: it is between us. I do not think I am overstating it if I say that we
have tucked into the crevices of language our understanding that in conversation we attempt to
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navigate our lives together and how we shall share a place.* Good conversations are generous, honest,
appropriately coarse and gentle; and I think we converse best when we do not believe or doubt too
easily. Please, be generous with me: I know I do not always get this right or use words precisely how
I would like to. I shall do my best to be generous, too—clear in the ways I can be and reassuring when
the going is difficult, but this too I may not do as well as I hope I do. So, go conversations. So, goes
living together.
Reapproach
I keep reapproaching the phenomenon of meaning because there is no single way to get at it, no right
way to get at it. Even as my fingers brush its surface and form, it is changing, moving, dancing with
me; and I can only keep trying to keep some amount of contact, grasp—some sense of connection. I
am trying to get at meaning briefly and fleetingly. It does not stay still long enough for me to keep it,
but it plays and cooperates with me:† lets me anticipate and lets me be surprised.‡ It lets me spur others
to anticipate and into surprise. And I wonder if this is how a bird feels on air currents, with something
it knows so well yet which can shift at any moment.

* Conversation comes from the Latin verb conversare, “to turn oneself about, to move to and fro, pass one’s life, dwell,
abide, live somewhere, keep company with.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “converse, v.,” March 2021,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/40763.
† It teases me too, mischievous and stubborn thing.
‡ As does language. Both meaning and language play, cooperate, tease; both let me anticipate and be surprised. I need to
speak loosely, with at least a little lead, to make sure I speak honestly of both meaning and language. It is Cadmean
to razor meaning from language. Although they are not the same, I have never known one separate from the other.
I do not think you have either. How blessed are we, then, to live so richly.
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What is it that holds together a theory of meaning? What is it expressed against? What questions
underpin it?
II
Is it enough of an answer to ask: What holds the world together? What is it expressed against? What
questions underpin it?
III
The ever-present question facing us philosophers of language is not new: How do I start an
examination into the medium of my examination? How do I begin looking at language? At meaning?
Understanding our understanding? Do I start from the grammar? From twisting, turning etymologies?
Do I ask the poets? Or data-glutted translation software? How do I go about documenting,
accounting, expressing the richness of our language—in its multiplicity—and of the world—in all its
plurality—language provides us with? How do I go about examining meaning when I have never not
been amidst it?
Contemplating the role of language by hypothesizing upon its absence is akin to examining
earthly life processes by sucking all oxygen from the room—the examiner winds up killing the
specimen and gasping for air themselves. So, I will try not to imagine what would be otherwise if we
did not have language; rather I will try to pay careful attention to the functioning of language—its
internal workings, its place in our lives, its outer and central most faculties.
Let us dispose of the over-analysis, false impartiality, and ten-foot-pole approach towards
language. We should not be squeamish about language: we should get hands-dirty in language’s
complexity and confusion. And let us wholly enjoy this sort of play.
IV
You philosophers, may I scream my loud frustrations when you give me your definitions and
accompanying equations? I come to your library aisles as close as I do to any sanctuary; so, know that
when I curse your names it is out of devotion to the questions we all love. My dear Gottlob, Bertrand,
Ludwig, Donald, Saul,* and all your colleagues, you have inscribed well in all of us that language is a

* Respectively: Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, and Saul Kripke.
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medium in which we seek to communicate truths about the world to each other with as little
interference as possible. My trusted mentors, you are very funny. And your inscriptions prevail, ironies
on walls that are read missing the humor you didn’t intend. I find you very, very funny.
Perhaps I do not catch your meaning or listen poorly or mistake you. But I must say: Bertrand,
I do not think I hear you wrong. You are so eager to get to talk about those true propositions and
denoting phrases, yes? So, eager to find this Scott who wrote Waverley.3 Gottlob, excellent
mathematician you are, do you not adore fitting all your words into equations?4 Saul, you toil on
Pierre’s behalf to amend his lacking geography.5 Donald, you dissect our malapropisms humorlessly.6
And even you, Ludwig, want to know—really know—the rules for construction workers.7
See, I believe I do hear you. I am listening. I do understand.
And, my mentors, you are so stubborn. I see your dedication to this plainer language, how you
deny yourselves the elation—utter fun—of playful language, and I do respect how you resist its
temptation. But do you ever consider you are neglecting it? Perhaps it is lonely. (I think things like this
can get lonely.)
I worry that your careful work on lasting inscriptions of plain sentences and stubborn neglect
of the rest may very well have misled us to our current conclusions and intuitions regarding meaning.
Are you sure that you have not kept busy giving consideration only to a sliver of language use and not
to the full scope? Are we sure we want to form our conclusions about language and meaning after
examining only these plain phrases?
V
Are we sure we want to pursue truth?
For this is what you are after, is it not? You ask if the present King of France is bald.8 You
want to know if the Moon is the same through a telescope and if it is indeed smaller than Earth; if
five is a prime number.9 You wonder if Nixon is automaton or flesh and blood.10 You ask if metaphors
are true.11 Isn’t that right, Donald?
You all go after truth as you attempt to find ways to represent our world. It is so important to
you that we represent it accurately. I, too, would prefer to know where the cliffs are so I may avoid
long falls, but my instinct is that I do not need to pursue truth for this. Meaning and truth are not the
same. I find that the meaning we make and engrain in the ways we navigate the world very usually
keep me on solid ground rather than any precise coordinates. And, most, I find that for whatever your
important motivations may be, you are unwilling to play or indulge others in play.
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I do not think it is a coincidence that children—who are us at the very beginnings of our being
creatures—play. How else ought we learn to navigate our world than by doing so joyfully and
curiously? Children play so curiously: asking questions, touching sticky hands to everything they can
get hold of, loving objects so tenderly. Children endear the world to themselves, and themselves to it.
My mentors, I cannot forsake play. I will not. Rather than truth, I want meaning; I want to
follow after what will let me make our world, not merely represent it.
I recall the story you tell, Jorge Luis:*
… In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection
that the map of a single Province occupies the entirety of a City, and
the map of the Empire, the entirety of the Province. In time those
Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers
Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire,
which coincided point for point with it.12
Truth may be the map, may be the natural scientist’s ground survey, but meaning is choreography for
our open-air dancing. And this hunt for the best ground surveys, for the bend of each blade of grass
only obscures the grass: prevents our dancing.
Are we sure we want to pursue truth? Do we follow after shallow truths or after the richness
of our lives?
VI
Of course, playful language and truthful language are not incompatible, let alone dichotomous; they
often go walking hand-in-hand.† Even so, we ought to remember that meaning is not the same as
truth.
The assumption that language is a medium of truth fundamentally undermines its playful
capacities because it radically changes how we look at and into language. We begin to search
obsessively for truth values and referents in speech,‡ rather than the intentions or successes of speakers
and speech. We ought really to be deliberate about what it is we are after, pursuing, and what shall

* Jorge Luis Borges.
† I think the more pertinent distinction lies between playful language and plainer language, a distinction which enables us to
set aside the question of truth from our considerations at least temporarily.
‡ Speech, here, is inclusive of all language use, whether verbal, written, or gesticulated—as in any comprehensive sign
language.
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give us satisfaction when we come upon it, unearth it, or (perhaps) erect it. I do not know what it is
that, when I find it, will satisfy me.
We are well and truly in a labyrinth of our own making: in language, in this quest we
philosophers of language have set ourselves, in meaning. Truth certainly offers us a stable light source
to pursue, but I do not believe that it will satisfy us. All it offers is an exit from the windings of our
lives.
VII
My mentors, I find myself dissatisfied with so many of your—Gottlob, Bertrand, J.L, and H.P.*—
approaches towards examining meaning and language. I long not to dissect each sentence and phrase
in hunt of passive, unimportant solutions that care not whether we understand each other. You look
for objective falsities and designations of truth, as though they can reward our effort with the affection
we so crave. I long to ask questions, to deal with language in a way that offers important, active
solutions: ones that we can use in our own lives. I grow frustrated with you, and I yearn for the
possibilities offered by an alternative approach.
This, of course, is not fair to you. It does not take you on your own terms. (I wonder if this is
part of the issue.) But to enter into the discussions and dissections that you pursue I already must
accept your focus on particular subject matter and must (to some extent) neglect the matters you
neglected. It is a labyrinth to follow your string while all the while wondering if we are missing
something, if there is a better path, if we ought not to chase escape. Yet, although I wonder, I am
hesitant to stray for fear of becoming lost.
VIII
I hope that meaning and language never become less richly convoluted than we are, for then how
would we cope with ourselves?
IX
When we appeal to language, we appeal to ourselves and the many ways we have used and are using
language. So, let us not suppose false divinity to language. It is us.

* New: J.L. Austin and H.P. Grice.
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Many of you philosophers of language have attempted to hug a porcupine without getting
pricked. My mentors, you have feared being touched by language even as you yet tried to hug it. I
want to hug language and to stop imagining it has spines. So, I shall hug it, and I do. I think that our
philosophy of language will be more successful if this is how we go forward: with open arms.
Language is us, and we are situated in it. As is, and as we are in, meaning. The sooner we can
run headlong into language and meaning’s embrace without bemoaning our participation, the sooner
we will actually be able to meet them. The sooner we will be able to meet ourselves.
X
If I have not yet made it clear: I am not interested in Truth.*
As I wrestle with our world—in order to understand it, cope with it, and live in it—I embrace
a strain of radical subjectivity. Together, we hold this world in tension upon the warp and weft of our
language, practices, meaning, and faith. Each of us engages in the world we hold, and each of us
participates in holding our world and reality.
It is our wrestling that we are moving on to and attempting to understand—our wrestling and
us wrestlers. So, perhaps, we now begin with our own impetus. Maybe rise, stretch your legs now. Let
us begin to wrestle when you return.
XI
As far as we understand—and as far as we may perhaps ever understand—we are alive. This
experience, thus far in our understanding, is inseparable from any attempt to understand. Natality, the
inception of something—experienced by each of us as that inseparable be-ing of ourself—is intrinsic
to any understanding we can hope to garner.
Yet, to be alive is not passive; to be alive is active. Instead: As far as we understand—and
as far as we may perhaps ever understand—we live. So, we experience living inseparably
from any attempt we make to understand our lives. Our natal inception is intrinsic to the
understanding we garner. (Sometimes I wonder if understanding the transformation of our
passivity to activity, the transformation of us from our passiveness to activeness, is the
human pursuit.)

* By TRUTH I mean the philosophical sort of Truth and the practices that prioritize it, not mere honesty.
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XII

Meaning is both bestowed and stowed in our world. We cannot hope to speak of meaning without
the world or the world without meaning, much less understand either.
So, we need to conceive of our existence in the world to understand what it is we are assuming.
Hannah,* you do this so well when you speak of the conditions for the lives—vita activa13 and vita
contemplativa14—we lead. We do not lead lives that are just reasoned, rather we lead lives that are
experienced. The commonalities between our lives are not proven quod erat demonstratum (Q.E.D) but
are adopted, taken, gathered from our own collected, remembered troves of experiences and then
gathered back into our own troves of experience. To conceive of our existence in the world we
assume.†
XIII
Assume, please, first: There is a world in which—into which—we are born and in which—out of
which—we die.
This is the basic condition of natality, from which we have not yet been able to rid ourselves,
and from which we should not. (When I say

WE,

I refer to that sapiens species among whom we,

people, humans, folks, guys, generally speak of.)
XIV
If you would, assume second: There are fellow alike and unalike beings—creatures and individuals—
with whom we together share this world.
Although I speak of WE, we are—as is obvious to any who have lived in this world—only one
of many other beings who are also born and who also die in this world; and from whom we should
not be too quick to distinguish ourselves. This is the basic condition of plurality.
XV
The world men are born into contains many things, natural and
artificial, living and dead, transient and sempiternal, all of which have
in common that they appear and hence are meant to be seen, heard,

* Hannah Arendt.
† Etymologically: “ad to + sūmĕre to take.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “assume, v.,” March 2021,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/12036.
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touched, tastes, and smelled, to be perceived by sentient creatures
endowed with the appropriate sense organs.15
by sentient, sensing creatures endowed with the capacity to engage in this world.*
(Hannah, I think that is what you meant.)†
XVI
Yes: “The world men are born into contains many things.”16
Men are born: Natality. The world contains many things: Plurality. These are the physical,
stubborn properties intrinsic in our existence. And, further, they establish the parameters as well as
the means by which we grasp our external world, internal worlds, and our selves. And these are
integrally social parameters. Plurality and Natality are the fundamental conditions of our human
existence.17, 18
XVII
Assume, please, third: All life that we have thus far come across, and whom we can, thus, speak of,
exists inside these parameters—Natality and Plurality.
XVIII
Assume, please, fourth: By nature of embodiment, all life exists in a form by which it is able to appear
and engage.

* I am doing my best to balance the variety of expression with the bodily expression of language and meaning. Speech,
speaking, talking, saying all reference the movements many of us make with our mouths; and these bodily ties are
useful to us—insistent upon the ways meaning is bound to the vessels and conditions of our experience. Yet, these
references are harmful and deceptive if taken as requisite. Speech occurs in gesture, on the page, in too many ways
to name. And though meaning and language are virtually inseparable, neither exists in our lives as a mere descendant
from perfunctory premises. Please recognize in the bright plumage around you that disability is as much a part of
the diversity of this earth as color. Language permeates, diversely, all of our lives because we live among (enough)
fellow language users that we get habituated into a linguistic world. Meaning permeates, diversely, all of our lives
because we live among (enough) fellow meaning beings that we get habituated into a meaningful world. We need not
assume our experiences with language or meaning are singular to recognize that they touch all of us. I pity the
jealous who try to convince us that language and meaning are exclusionary beasts.
† Hannah, you extend a remarkable sort of generosity to your interlocutors when you paraphrase them so we may hear
what they meant. I hope to extend you the same trust. Going forward, all subsequent italic interruptions of and
notes on quoted passages are my own.
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XIX

In this world which we enter, appearing from a nowhere, and from
which we disappear into a nowhere, Being and Appearing coincide. …
Nothing and nobody exists in this world whose very being does not
presuppose a spectator. In other words, nothing that is, insofar as it
appears, exists in the singular: everything that is is meant to be
perceived by somebody. Not Man but men inhabit this planet.19
XX or XXII
I have a favor to ask of you: please read the next two sections before this one. If you need, I can tell
you why now but, if you would, please do me this favor before I tell you why. If you are willing, please
read the next two sections before finishing this one.
René,* it is not a kind request to ask us to sever ourselves from nerve endings, select which
neurons we trust, set aside the chores and commitments of our lives.20 It is not kind to ask us to
abdicate the beings we are. I refuse to do this. Not only can I not (and I cannot) but I will not; for to
do so misleads me and misleads us. We are fully in our bodies and in our manifold relation to the
world. These two conditions most remarkably situate us as active and acting creatures. We have a gut
understanding: a gut urge.
Have you stayed or are you returning? The favor I ask is for you to imagine a landscape and
yourself in it, so that you may go forward into it and explore as you wish. As you imagine this
landscape, do you deny yourself your nerve endings? And, if you did, would you also be denying
yourself the joys of living? Are you willing to deny yourself the joys of living?
XXI or XX
Do me a favor, please? Do me a favor, will you? In a moment, close your eyes and bring this landscape
to view in your mind:
Beneath the Flammarion-sphered† sky, you stand on one gentle swell of hilltop, among many.
Over the ground as far as you can see, the softest spring grass glistens in breezes. You stand in a
macrocosm of a meadow. You see, on nearby surrounding hills just like yours, figures; some you
recognize—an old friend, a neighbor, a sibling—but many others are strangers to you. Each face is
* René Descartes.
† A wood engraving that depicts a man at the edge of the Earth’s firmament as he peeks his head through into the
celestial spheres. Wikipedia, s.v. “Flammarion engraving,” last modified March 22, 2021, 03:57 UTC,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flammarion_engraving.
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confused, a reflection of your own questions: Why are we here? Does anyone else—do you—know
what is happening? Is that – um, what’s their name again? As you watch similar surprise and wonder
and confusion bud on each brow, you feel how the wind rustling the grass brushes the hairs on your
arms as well. You feel the morning coolness of the grass against your bare feet. You smell the petrichor
of damp soil. And you feel the pull of muscles as you blink, pass a warming hand over goosebumps,
turn your head. It comes into consciousness that you can move: you are already moving. This place is
not static. You can go to whomever you wish, speak with whomever you want. Wherever you wish to
go, you can go, explore. You see this same understanding budding in those around you, on their hills.
And some have stepped forward, heading towards friends or strangers. Someone is crouching to touch
an unknown wildflower. Someone laughs, rolling down their hill. Your body feels fully alive.
Let this place come into your mind and give it your attention for a minute or so—for a little
while let it be yours entirely. Please, close your eyes. Now, close your eyes.
XXII or XXI
When you have let this place dissipate, would you be willing to tell me about it? I would like to hear
which pebbles you pocketed, familiar faces you sought, which trees you passed as you talked with a
stranger. I ask because that goosebump sensation attunes us to our own capabilities and efficacy. Your
raised hairs make you deeply aware of your own skin, arms, and body, so that you are fully aware of
your ability to move and manipulate them as you wish. In seeing ourselves among others, our curiosity
morphs into choice and action.
Do you second-guess that you engage in the world as you engage in the world? I ask because
I want to know if you hesitate to believe yourself active when let loose in such a wondrous, verdant
place.
XXIII
Assume, please, fifth: Embodiment, corporeality makes us unable to be coterminous with others; so,
all life occupies a unique vantage point.
XXIV
We have a constellation of words to get at some gut understanding: ABILITY, ABLE, ACT, ACTION,
ACTIVE, ACTIVITY, AGENCY, AGENT, AUTONOMY, CAPABILITY, CAPABLE, CAPACITY, POTENCE,
POTENCY, POTENT, POWER, POWERFUL.

When we get at this gut understanding with these words,
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what is it that we are getting at? Distinctions exist between these words, of course, but so does
commonality. And there is something there, some gut understanding that we attempt to fit into
syllables.
XXV
Our words for this gut understanding can tell us about what nourishes it—what it springs from, where
it exerts itself, how we feel it. To thoroughly present how our intuitions are carried in our words, I am
laying out these etymologies in full, but please feel free to skim as you like; I will gather the pertinent
themes together in the next section.
First, our pair ABILITY21 and ABLE22, 23 come—by different routes—from the Latin habilis, from
habēre24 “to hold, possess, have, handle,” which goes all the way back to the same hypothesized ProtoIndo-European root, *ghabh- (“to give or receive”), that gives us HABIT, HABITABLE, and HABITANT.25
Second, our cluster

ACT,26, 27 ACTION,28 ACTIVE,29

and

ACTIVITY30

descend through various

routes from the Latin āctus, from agere, which has an impressive range of meanings: foremost “to drive”
but also “to come, to go, … to urge, … to do something, … to be busy, to work, to stage (a play), to
take part in (a play), to perform (a part) in a play, … to strive for, … to celebrate, observe, to spend
(time), to experience, enjoy, to live.”31 Going back, the Proto-Indo-European ancestor of agere is *ag(“to drive, draw, move”).32 As well, AGENCY33 and AGENT34 come from agere, going back to *ag-.35, 36
Third, AUTONOMY37 borrows the Greek autonomiā,38 from autonomos,39 a compound of auto(“self, one’s own, by oneself, independently”)40 and nomos (“usage, custom, law, melody,
composition”).41 Of these, nomos goes back to the Proto-Indo-European root *nem-, “to assign, allot;
also to take.”42
Fourth, our pair

CAPABILITY43

and

CAPABLE44

derive—by way of French—from the Latin

45

capabilis, from capere “to take, seize, catch,” which goes back to the Proto-Indo-European root *kap“to grasp.”46 Relatedly, CAPACITY47 derives, also through the French, from the Latin capācitāt-em, from
capāx, capāci- (“able to take in”),48 from capĕre (“to take”).49 And capĕre then goes back to the ProtoIndo-European *kap-.50 As well, CAPACIOUS is related to

CAPACITY

through the Latin,51, 52 indicating

that CAPACITY loosely deals with spaciousness; that is, capacity has a root spatial sense.
Fifth, our cluster POTENCE,53 POTENCY,54 and POTENT55 descend through multiple routes from
the Latin potēns,56 from posse, “to be able, to be possible, to have power to avail,” which is a compound
of potis (“having the power, able”) and esse (“to be”).57, 58 Further, potis comes from *poti- (“powerful;
lord”),59 and esse comes from *es (“to be”).60, 61 Note that the Gothic brūth-faths (“bridegroom”),

On Eager Tenterhooks

Levi, 15

Sanskrit pati (“master”), and Greek posis (“husband”) all resemble the Latin potis.62, 63 As well, POWER64
and POWERFUL65 derive from posse, going back to *poti-.66, 67
XXVI
Gathering together the intuitions within our etymological vivisection, we can see the conditions that
give rise to this gut understanding at the center of our constellation. This constellation of words
invokes territorial claims and interpersonal relations. That is, this constellation invokes the material
and meaningful conditions of our lives: the dirt, matter, and territory that we occupy as well as the
linguistic, loving, intangible—meaningful—lives we lead together.
ABILITY,

ABLE, CAPABILITY, CAPABLE,

and

CAPACITY

all reference the immediate tangibility

that is most clear as the sensation of weight in your palm or of your fingers’ grip. This grasping is not
unconnected to the sense of spatial occupation that

CAPACITY

carries in its relation to

CAPACIOUS.

This grasping is not unconnected to the basic existence asserted by the roots esse and *es- in POTENCE,
POTENCY,

and POTENT. Nor is this grasping unconnected to the sense of territory referenced by the

roots potis *poti- in POTENCE, POTENCY, POTENT, POWER, and POWERFUL; as potis and *poti- both get
at the base sense of power, they reference those people and positions which own and occupy physical
territory and matter: lord, master, husband, and bridegroom. As well,

AUTONOMY’s

root *nem-

specifically references material allocation or taking.
ACT,

ACTION, ACTIVE, ACTIVITY, AGENCY, AND AGENT

get at the sense of impetus and

momentum, which we experience as we move ourselves through this world. The verb implicit in
ABILITY and ABLE’s root *ghabh-, “to give or receive;”68 in CAPABILITY, CAPABLE, and CAPACITY’s root

*kap-, “to grasp;”69 and in

AUTONOMY’s

root *nem-, “to assign, allot; or to take,”70 all reference our

motions through this world and interaction with and among others.
To get at this gut understanding we reference the tangible and we reference our touching of
the tangible. We do not owe our gut understanding to sterile impartiality or proud objectivity. We are
powerful, we are agent, are alive, we are us because we are bound to limited material vantage points
and we reach out to the rest of the world from these vantages.
XXVII
Please assume, sixth: Living beings have all developed faculties for existing and for prolonging their
existence. From prokaryotes we have become eukaryotes and grown ourselves into centenarian
tortoises, millenarian redwoods, and opposably-thumbed bipeds.
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XXVIII

Assume, please, seventh: Through a variety of faculties, beings sense and engage with fellow life—and
matter—from their unique vantage points.
XXIX
We are tasked not only to be active agents—ourselves the beginnings of rippling chains of action and
reaction—but also to contend* with and among like members of our species.
XXX
Our tangible vantage and motion sets the parameters for our engagement in the world. Courage is
inherent in a willingness to act, in a willingness to engage with and in the world.
The connotation of courage, which we now feel to be an indispensable
quality of the hero, is in fact already present in a willingness to act and
speak at all, to insert one’s self into the world and begin a story of one’s
own.71
This courage is the courage of a particular, individuated form willing to set into motion unanticipated
possibilities—to risk, or choose, ramifications. Were we not individuated beings tenuously existing,
appearing, engaging, surviving amidst other and fellow individuated beings also existing, appearing,
engaging, surviving – well, perhaps then this would not be courage. But we are individuated beings
tenuously existing, appearing, engaging, surviving amidst other and fellow individuated beings also
existing, appearing, engaging, surviving. So, we are courageous.
We see not only that our gut understanding results from our uniquely embodied vantage, but
that it is our uniquely embodied vantage that makes us vulnerable, significant, courageous. We are
limited. And everything becomes important in limitation.
And this courage is not necessarily or even primarily related to a
willingness to suffer the consequences; courage and even boldness are
already present in leaving one’s own private hiding place and showing
who one is, in disclosing and exposing one’s self.72
We require embodied, imperfect, self-protective ties to an anchoring form and vantage point
to be able to reveal or risk anything. Action is intrinsically courageous not only in this self-revelation

* Etymologically: “con- + tendĕre to stretch, strain, strive.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “contend, v.,” March 2021,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/40136.
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but in self-revelation among others. In being among others when we reveal ourselves there is a
boundless potentiality of reaction and ramification. While courage does not require us to be willing to
suffer the consequences, it requires us to be willing to create consequences—that is, to enter and
impact the world even though we cannot fully anticipate the effects of our entrance or of our efforts.
We are able to take this leap of courage because we do not know what will happen. Not knowing
makes it courage.
Action requires grounded-ness in a particular form and perspective. Action has
unanticipated—un-anticipable—consequences. In acting we set into motion new and never-beforeseen chains of reaction. In action we are liable to mistakes. Action requires its actor to be grounded
in a specific time and place, with a certain level of self-perspective (both self-knowledge, and selfinterest), and to—from that point—possess the courage to act in a world of un-anticipable
consequences.
XXXI
Assume, please, eighth: As beings exist in their embodied forms, they navigate space and milieu
uniquely.
As we navigate, the conditions of our forms and of our environment press upon us.
XXXII
It is these conditions of the world and our lives that we respond to constantly—conditions which we,
of course, shape deeply.
XXXIII
Natality and Plurality, the conditions of the world, give birth to the conditions of our lives: Being and
Appearing. In Being we are alive and alike: “If this inside were to appear, we would all look alike.”73
Yet, our bodies are separate, unable to be coterminous; they establish each of us in our own
individuated vantage point. In Appearing we distinguish and are distinguishable: “The outside shapes
are infinitely varied and highly differentiated; among the higher animals we can usually tell one
individual from another.”74 Yet, in appearing (and witnessing), we are all “never mere subjects”75 but
are always simultaneously both objects and subject, and we are all participating and witnessing our
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exchanging of these positions.* We must consider the phenomenal—in both senses of the word†—
nature of the world: we are embodied and sensing. This is all but irrevocable.
XXXIV
In watching our individuated, appearing bodies navigate through the world, we recognize ourselves
amongst others, and we can begin to recognize how it is that our world, and reality, appear to and are
held by us. Once again:
Nothing and nobody exists in this world whose very being does not
presuppose a spectator. In other words, nothing, that is, insofar as it
appears, exists in the singular; everything that is is meant to be
perceived by somebody.76
In this way, we do not get a choice to be among others. To be as we are—to be ourselves—we must
be among others.‡ We do not get to doubt our plural existence unless we fully doubt it in our hearts,
in our deeds. But I admit that I cannot: it is too much for me to doubt. I do not want to be lonely. I
do not say this by way of confession, but by way of reassurance that we do not face mass exodus: I
am not willing to doubt plurality in my heart. Are you? Do you know anyone willing?
XXXV
Could it not be that appearances are not there for the sake of the life
process but, on the contrary, that the life process is there for the sake
of appearances? Since we live in an appearing world, is it not much more
plausible that the relevant and the meaningful in this world of ours
should be located precisely on the surface? 77
XXXVI
And even if surgeries and wounds bring forth sudden internal appearances, it is the authentic
appearances, which delight in appearing and commit to our lasting gazing, that are the stuff of our
world. Though our insides and electrical impulses are neither identical nor the same, it is through our

* Here I want to point to a theme, perhaps the thesis of this project: conflict and tension are valuable—not in every
instance, not in many—but they are valuable and intrinsic to our existence.
† PHENOMENONAL refers to both the marvelous patterns of our world as well as to that which is known sensorily.
Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “phenomenal, adj. and n.,” March 2021,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/142340.
‡ As an aside, this strongly parallels Ludwig’s argument against private language and for common language.
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authentically appearing outsides that we can lastingly differentiate between one another. It is how we
have evolved to interact and to survive: I cannot bare my liver to you casually. (I—we— have an urge
to preserve ourselves as alive creatures.)
XXXVII
Assume, please, ninth: As we navigate, we have an urge not only to sustain and prolong our existence
but to enjoy it.
We crave the shelter and warmth of dens, yes, but also the breezes as we run rampant through
fields with the sun hot on our shoulders, laughter loud. Our joys are as varied as we are: girls in flower
crowns and tulip-dwelling harvest mice. Some of us like the best berries, others adrenaline thrills.
XXXVIII
Assume, please, tenth: We are pressed upon to behave as is effective for our existence and for our
engagement with others.
That is, the whole of life can be expected to tend to behave as is effective for existence and,
more individually, creatures can be expected to behave in ways they feel are effective. This is the
expectation, not the rule.
XXXIX
… the predominance of outside appearance implies, in addition to the
sheer receptivity of our senses, a spontaneous activity: whatever can see
wants to be seen, whatever can hear calls out to be heard, whatever can touch presents
itself to be touched. It is indeed as though everything that is alive—in
addition to the fact that its surface is made for appearance, fit to be
seen and meant to appear to others—has an urge to appear, to fit itself
into the world of appearances by displaying and showing, not its “inner
self” but itself as an individual. …
… The expressiveness of an appearance, however, is of a different
order; it “expresses” nothing but itself, that is, it exhibits or displays.78
XL
Appearance brings meaning to the life-sustaining organs and bodily operations of animals, not the
other way around. Would you tell me, in earnest, that my kidney and liver and gall bladder are more
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truly—that is, tangibly really, significantly—me than my face? Would you peddle such fallacy? There
is no truer form of a thing lying behind its façade, and no absolute truth.
XLI
We so relish our appearing: preening, cawing, flocking as we do. We braid our hair and weave flowers
through friends’. We spend hours talking and typing late into the night, our faces or words illuminated
bright. We reach towards each other in told and untold ways. Do you not?
XLII
By my mere existing, urged to prolong and enjoy my appearing being, I am forever displaying,*
unfurling.
… but the life of our soul is in its very intensity much more adequately
expressed in a glance, a sound, a gesture, than in speech. …
My soul is in glances, sounds (giggles and gasps), gestures. Do you tell me jokes to search
out my soul and reassure you it is here?
Unlike thoughts and ideas, feelings, passions, and emotions can no
more become part and parcel of the world of appearances than can our
inner organs. What appears in the outside world in addition to physical
signs is only what we make of them through the operation of thought.
Every show of anger, as distinct from the anger I feel, already contains
a reflection on it, and it is this reflection that gives the emotion the
highly individuated form with is meaningful for all surface phenomena.
… In other words, the emotions I feel are no more meant to be shown
in their unadulterated state than the inner organs by which we live. …
Hannah, perhaps it is so that my emotions are not meant to be shown, that in life if they
are shown they do pass through my consciousness. But I wonder if this is a tandem process
or a linear one? And were my infant wails also the product of thought? Or is it rather that
the relaying of emotion is for the benefit of others or the benefit of myself through others?
Certainly, we presuppose another—at least, and most often others—in our performance of
ourselves. But such performance is also for ourselves, enabled by our understanding of what
it is to perform and to watch. We can perform for ourselves and for others. So, while
* Etymologically from the Latin desplicāre “to scatter, disperse, (in late and medieval Latin) to unfold.” Oxford English
Dictionary Online, s.v. “display, v.,” March 2021, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/55051.
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emotion may not be meant to be shown, fear drives us to the safety of guardians and anger
propels us forward in defense of loved ones. Emotive beings reach towards each other.

Our mental activities, by contrast, are conceived in speech even before
being communicated, but speech is meant to be heard and words are
meant to be understood by others who also have the ability to speak
… Thought without speech is inconceivable; “thought and speech
anticipate one another. They continually take one another’s place”;
they actually take each other for granted.79
XLIII
It is no divine thing that speech and thought anticipate each other. Hannah, you say emotions pass
through consciousness to be seen, so, say you say these outward expressions of feeling presuppose
“reflection.”80 I suggest that rather than reflection, expression presupposes others: both in instinct,
choice, reaction, and evolution itself. We relish our mates and flocks so affectionately that we have
evolved ourselves slowly to imagine ourselves our own fellows whom we keep with us even alone.
Speech and thought anticipate one another only as much as we anticipate that we listen and
we express: that is, only as much as we anticipate others. We habituate this anticipation in our
conversations and silent monologues.
XLIV
We love preening, cawing, flocking so much we do it with ourselves. We imagine ourselves to
ourselves, hum songs for ourselves, narrate our daily movements to ourselves, imagine fellows for
ourselves, dialogue with our imagined fellows, monologue for ourselves. We unfurl ourselves even to
ourselves, taking joy in our own glances and giggles. In the glimpses we too get of ourselves, we hone
our motor skills into precise movements—we learn the differences between our own expressions to
lay out our talents for not only our imagined fellows but for the others who surround us.
XLV
In addition to the urge towards self display by which living things fit
themselves into a world of appearances, men also present themselves in
deed and word and thus indicate how they wish to appear, what in their
opinion is fit to be seen and what is not. This element of deliberate
choice in what to show and what to hide seems specifically human. Up
to a point we can choose how to appear to others, and this appearance
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is by no means the outward manifestation of an inner disposition; if it
were, we probably would all act and speak alike. …
… The passions and emotions of our soul are not only bodybound, they seem to have the same life-sustaining and preserving
functions as our inner organs … Such choices are determined by
various factors; many of them are predetermined by the culture into
which we are born—they are made because we wish to please others.
But there are also choices not inspired by our environment; we may
make them because we wish to please ourselves or because we wish to
set an example, that is, to persuade others to be pleased with what
pleases us. Whatever our motives may be, success and failure in the
enterprise of self-presentation depend on the consistency and duration
of the image thereby presented to the world.
Since appearances always present themselves in the guise of
seeming, pretense and willful deception on the part of the performer,
error and illusion on the part of the spectator are, inevitably, among
the inherent potentialities. Self-preservation is distinguished from selfdisplay by the active and conscious choice of the image shown; selfdisplay has no choice but to show whatever properties a living being
possesses. … When I make such a decision, I am not merely reacting
to whatever qualities may be given to me; I am making an act of
deliberate choice among the various potentialities of conduct with
which the world has presented me. … Obviously, self-presentation and
the sheer thereness of existence are not the same.81
(Hannah, is it really that the world presents potentialities to me? Do I sit so passively?
Await?)
XLVI
Another favor, please?
In the meadow you spend your time as you please and watch others do the same. Your
afternoon strolls take you to the places that have grown dear and to places you have not yet been. Into
the grass, you tread worn your desire paths.* You tread your own and follow those that others have
worn real. As you make them, there are becoming ways to move through this meadow. But no matter
the habits and routes, you may go where you like through the thigh-high grasses.

* A desire path is “an unplanned route or path (such as one worn into a grassy surface by repeated foot traffic) that is
used by pedestrians in preference to or in absence of a designated alternative.” Merriam-Webster, s.v. “desire line, n.,”
accessed May 5, 2021, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/desire%20line.
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You shape this place as do others and, going where you wish, you trust that together you are
attempting a place that pleases you all. Even when you wander and wind up far from where you meant,
it is somewhere someone loves. You trust this as long as you trust that others are earnest in where
they go.
We need these to be paths of earnest desire so that they do not lead us astray.
XLVII
Assume, please, eleventh: Our own unique vantages, faculties, and navigation of the world, give rise
to semblances* that distort our appearances and our interaction, engaging.
XLVIII
Our meadow is beneath the Flammarion-sky:82 we are on Earth, orbiting Solaris, orbited ourselves by
our Moon, passing in parallel circuits alongside Venus and Mars. Once, we saw ourselves at the center,
and remarked how Mars contorted itself in strange retrograde to stay near to us. Semblances abound
from our Earthly vantage point and from our vantage points on Earth. Authentically, we will never
not see Mars painting flourishes in the night sky like lace scalloping around us—at least not until we
part from our planet. Yet, we have amended our vantaged vision, recalibrate ourselves as heliocentric.
XLIX
Since choice as the decisive factor in self-presentation has to do with
appearances, and since appearance has the double function of
concealing some interior and revealing some “surface” … there is
always the possibility that what appears may by disappearing turn out
finally to be a mere semblance. Because of the gap between inside and
outside, between the ground of appearance and appearance—or to put
it differently, no matter how different and individualized we appear
and how deliberately we have chosen this individuality—it always
remains true that “inside we are all alike,” … Hence, there is always an
element of semblance in all appearance: the ground itself does not
appear. From this it does not follow that all appearances are mere
semblances. Semblances are possible only in the midst of appearances;
they presuppose appearance as error presupposes truth. Error is the
price we pay for truth, and semblance is the price we pay for the
* Hannah, you distinguish between authentic and inauthentic semblances—the distortion bound up in being ourselves in
our bodies and the distortion that we might remedy. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 28–29.
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wonders of appearance. Error and semblance are closely connected
phenomena; they correspond with each other.
Semblance is inherent in a world ruled by the twofold law of
appearing to a plurality of sensitive creatures each equipped with the
faculties of perception. Nothing that appears manifests itself to a single
viewer capable of perceiving it under all its inherent aspects. The world
appears in the mode of it-seems-to-me, depending on particular
perspectives determined by location in the world as well as by
particular organs of perception. This mode not only produces error,
which I can correct by changing my location, drawing closer to what
appears, or by improving my organs of perception with the help of
tools and implements, or by using my imagination to take other
perspectives into account; it also gives birth to true semblances, that
is, to deceptive appearance, which I cannot correct like an error since
they are caused by my permanent location on the earth and remain
bound up with my own existence as one of the earth’s appearances.83
L
Again, in the meadow you stand on your grassy hillock and look out at the disparate crowd
surrounding you. It is as if intense heat warps the air, or as if moisture hanging heavy pulls not only
the horizon but the figure of nearby things out of shape. Or perhaps this place is melting and dancing.
You find that, between blinks, a withered tree is not the woman you believed it. You catch sight of a
bird in your periphery and realize the bird never was. The sky is clear until it goes star-speckled.
And yet, though the scene wavers as if the whole field were on fire, the air remains cool and
dew-slicked. You feel, deep in your stomach, that these miraged illusions are not visible to those
standing around you. Not to anyone else. And you believe, deep in your stomach, that different
phantasma appear to each person standing in this place.
Amid this rippling environ, your balance is not so steady, nor your trust. Any step might find
you upon a quaking bog. Goosebumps and grass between your toes reassure you this is no
hallucination, but false steps and this fluctuating world caution you that you may not bear accurate
witness.
LI
We are alive briefly, on this particular orb in the cosmos, for this particular span of time, and inside
of this particular flesh and blood incarnation. Everything that we see and engage with – everything is
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filtered through the unique lens of the body and the world we have been born into. Semblances result
from the fixedness of our form, our material existence: the first gift of our natality: material existence.
The paradox of Being is that, as our innards are alike, our inhabitation of our bodies roots us
in individuated perspectives. The criterion for a living thing—“the relatively short time span of its full
appearance, its epiphany”84—forms our optic lens, as does our living form, so: “authentic illusions …
are by no means the same for each species but connected with the form and mode of their specific
life-process.” 85 Not only this, but our individual perspective alters, even just slightly, how the light
strikes and how the world of appearances appears to us. So, too, the paradox of Appearing is that who
and what appears to me fluctuates and who I appear to be fluctuates across time and between
spectators.
LII
Upon the quaking bogs we are amidst the living chaos of simultaneous authentic and inauthentic
distortion. Some of the rippling haze and mirage before me is bound up in me-in-my-body, some is
simply fatigue, hunger, cataracts, and some is that I am looking the wrong way to find the bird I heard
call out in the distance. So, the chaos of the chaos is that authentic and inauthentic distortions do not
differentiate themselves for us. In fact, they mix—not separate nor always separable. Shared though
some of these mirages may be, I also feel deep in my gut that some of them are mine only. I reach out
for hands to grasp and hold me steady as they can upon this rippling underfoot.
LIII
Thomas,* you bring us together and bind us by promise as we flee natural and selfish perils. I share in
your faith, for yours is sincerely faith. You see us diversely—muscular and slender, cleverer and less
so86—and still you trust us to choose each other and to promise well- and earnest-enough that our
promises hold.
But first you give us discrepant innards and perceptions. You recognize that we do not
navigate the world identically. You constitute us as both deeply mechanistic and inconsistent:
The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth
the organ … which pressure, … continued inwards to the Brain, and
the Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or

* Thomas Hobbes.
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endeavour of the heart to deliver it self: which endeavour, because
Outward seemeth to be some matter without.87
Yet, in this you give us important embodied variety physically and cognitively: “there bee found one
man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another.”88 Yet, this does not
diminish the value of any one of us, for:
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as
that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger
in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned
together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable,
as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which
another may not pretend, as well as he.89
This diversity of our forms and abilities does not produce a hierarchy, rather an equality. You give
each one of us value in inhabiting our own vantage with our individuated limitations.
For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge
many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet
they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they
see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this
proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall. For
there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any
thing, than that every man is contented with his share. From this
equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends.90
And so, you recognize that our gut understanding and motion hails from our embodied existence and
display. In all of this, you give us (tentative) cooperation—“confederacy.”91 You give us common
words and syntax for all our endeavors92 (and soon for our promises).
And then, courageously, you put your faith in us—in these sorts of beings we are.
LIV
Assume, please, twelfth: By nature of behaving in a plural world, we sense fluctuating functional
agreement amidst our engagement with the world and each other.
LV
I like to distinguish, sometimes, between the formal agreement—a logical, reasoned, and intelligible
argument for why, despite the discrepancies of mental and sensory experience, we might trust reality
without a doubt—and functional agreement, which simply suffices. Functional agreement is simply
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how we interact with things and one another, and it very often gives us the trust we need to live our
lives. My mentors and fellow philosophers, I want to hold your hands and reassure ourselves that we
need not fear formal doubt.
LVI
Our own engagement in the world—navigation through it—and others’ calls our attention to the
world. My friend takes me down a street I never noticed was there. Lightning strikes and I ask: “Did
you see that?” Thunder rolls in: “Did you hear that?” We turn and reach to others so we may call to
their attention the world that we see and feel before us. And we turn and reach to others so they may
call to our attention the world they see and feel before them. In the moments when semblances ripple
across our senses, stirring doubt in our hearts, we reach out. Sleep-deprived as I currently am, I cannot
assure myself into satisfaction that the cup of water next to me is indeed really beside me. So, I look
to my others to gauge if they can drink from it, if it appears mere apparition to them too.
And my mentors, this affirmation—agreement—we seek from others is not reassurance to
remedy the shallow formal doubts we hypothesize for academic papers. This affirmation we seek is
for heartfelt doubt. So, it has no easy logical, premise-able solution. It is agreement that requires us to
ask, to reach out. Forgive me if I seem at all like I am speaking of Truth if I go on to say “confidence”
or “functional agreement” too formally. This agreement is no formal thing. Any confidence we have
is that same sort as the confidence we walk into a room with. Any functional agreement we have is
the same sort we get when double checking that, yes, we are still good for lunch at two. This agreement
is a promise: not static or stable but better. This agreement is trustworthy.
LVII
We can affirm our confidence in reality through sensory terms, not rational ones (Q.E.D.). Reality is
not a certainty we come by but is an assurance with which we engage in the world. Reality is an
agreement we have with others. It is enough to accept that the ways we interact with each other and
with the world demonstrate sufficient agreement upon shared reality.
Even if we were unable to reach formal agreement, would you act as though a projectile
hurtling at your head was mere apparition? Or would you dodge? If you are unsure, may I suggest you
ask someone nearby to aid you in a material demonstration? You might, if you would like, observe
your actions when the stakes are made explicit (perhaps with arrows and an apple).
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Once again, this is the sort of doubt that is not ours to have easily. It is doubt that we only get
to have when we fully doubt in our hearts, in our actions. Remember in this, that life is never safe
from real pressure, from the urge to prolong your existence. You do not get to put your doubt in
padded walls. It is not significant doubt if it does not withstand the real stakes of our lives.
Still, even if a given individual does not duck, if you muster significant doubt, our agreement
on reality lies not between the individual and the projectile. It lies between us and our fellows. Crucial
as our agreement is, it is not so fragile that you on your own may rend it. Commonly and collectively,
we dodge, and we expect others to dodge. So, functional agreement upon reality exists and is preserved
in the ways we interact with one another and our surroundings as though they are real and as though
others are also experiencing them.* Reality is fundamentally physical and sensory. Reality becomes a
sixth sense, a common sense, sensus communis† which is constantly reinforced by our interaction with
and among others, because we cannot help but be members of a social species.
LVIII
On your grassy hillock, the landscape is not always so dizzying. Sometimes, it is as still as a breezeless
day and hardly a leaf quakes. Sometimes, you cannot find a leaf that stays still long enough for you to
see it as one among all the others. Always fluctuating, you can breathe and navigate your way—
expecting and correcting stumbles as well as misconceptions. And each stroll forward, whether clumsy
or not, convinces your heartbeat that this changing world is no extraordinary peril. Springtime strolls
delight you with both material and iridescent flux: both the matter, the hillsides of daffodils that open
with the dawn or sway with the breezes, and the iridescent meaning, a brief sunlit dazed moment
somehow stretches, to your surprise, into full hours of the afternoon. The flux is jarring as it is joyous.
LIX
How then, do we trust ourselves to navigate through the world amidst a riotous cacophony of
competing semblances? How do we establish any sense of surety?

* René, I think this resolves your dream conundrum. We do not consistently—before, during, and after dreaming—act as
though the dream is experienced as real by others. And if we were to act this way, it may not be so much a
misunderstanding of reality, but an actual change and evolution of reality.
† “What … we call common sense, the sensus communis, is a kind of sixth sense needed to keep my five senses together
and guarantee that it is the same object that I see, touch, taste, smell, and hear …” Hannah Arendt, The Life of the
Mind, 50.
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Assume, if you would, thirteenth: At the point of convergence of behavior and agreement, therein lies
reality.
LXI
Sight—our eyes’ sensory mechanism—forces us to reconcile two images into one, yet we experience
fluctuations. (Close one eye, then open it and close the other; the world before you shifts ever so
slightly.) The common sense we have for reality forces us to reconcile the interactions of our fellows
within our common surroundings with our own experiences of those surroundings.
We hold the world in common in tension, trusting ourselves to sense when reality is not so
easy to trust or when our fibrous connections fray. Though the reality of the world may flicker—just
as our vision does, when switching from one eye closed to the other—the inconsistency demonstrates
the tension inherent in our sensus communis. Without these flickers, we would have no indication that
our sense of reality was indeed only our own individual sense, rooted in our own vantage.
The very contention between perspectives guarantees the firmness of their alignment; the
flickering of our agreed-upon reality is the prickling of hairs along the spine that assures me I have
not gone numb. When I wake from my dream and readjust to the world around me, I am given new
confidence in the reality of the world. Flickers make us even more sure of our agreement-that: that we
agree and what we agree upon. We need a natal world to give each of us fixedness in a form, from
which authentic semblances then stem. We need a plural world to make us appear, and to make all
appear to us—wherein emerges the contention integral to the sensus communis. And through the sensus
communis we ground reality in mutuality.
LXII
Interaction within a plurality guarantees reality. Not only do semblances explain discrepancy, they
justify our trust of reality. Semblances predispose us to engage with the world and each other
differently, so the commonalities amidst this vast variation of individuals indicate a firmness—that we
are all being similarly impacted. Whereas thinking—that meaning-bound apparatus—need not
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correspond to reality, we sense that where our engagement aligns, we find validity.* Reality, by nature
of this ever-shifting convergence, is always in flux. But is also always shared.
LXIII
Reality is “the claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their
existence.”93 Reality is a reciprocal relationship.
The worldliness of living things means that there is no subject that is
not also an object and appears as such to somebody else who
guarantees its “objective” reality.94
Both claiming and guaranteed, reality attracts and demands attention; we, in paying attention, guarantee
reality to the surrounding world of appearances. As in any paradox, there is a tension within reality.
Reality requires reciprocity but continually imposes upon and challenges us. In the desert, sand caught
up by the wind chafes your cheeks, sun blisters your skin, and a glistening oasis—perhaps mirage—
draws you nearer to it. Within the world of appearances there may not be any route to the clear and
unshakable reality philosophers have quested after for so long. And this is fine. We do not need it.
LXIV
Reality is held in tension—hung on myriad thin strings between us. Yet, when one string unravels
many more are there to hold the fabric while any individual spinster repairs their thread. This is how
we get surety in reality, in the world, in worldly things.
LXV
But we are in the world. Are we also tied to this warp and weft?
LXVI
I imagine this fabric of reality in surreal vivid imagery. The expanse of the infinite, inky-dark universe
it all around, scattered celestial bodies at the peripheries of our vision. But the foreground, midground,
background of this space is occupied by glowing, neon-fuchsia interwoven threads of light. We are
small enough amidst this loose weave to duck our way between the threads. Although they are loose,

* Meaning and knowledge of reality are, of course, two entirely different faculties: the distinction between reason and
intellect “coincides with a distinction between two altogether different mental activities, thinking and knowing, and
two altogether different concerns, meaning … and cognition.” Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 14.
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they are firm. This fabric extends everywhere. Positioned between its fibers it is near impossible to
doubt that it will hold. It goes on everywhere.
But also, it is near impossible to doubt because, around my waist, I am lassoed by a thread all
my own. I am an astronaut tethered to the fabric of our reality, and my movements do tug and shift
the weft of the common cloth. I am untethered, unattached in open space if I cut myself loose of my
cord. I feel deep in my gut that if I doubt, I shall slice through this protection connection. How then,
will I breathe?
I am tethered to this common cloth the same as my fellows. In this, I know I promise to them
that I shall keep it intact. I shall not endanger their tethers nor my own.
LXVII
Thomas, the crux of your trust in us to make lasting promises lies in the faith produced by the stakes
and diversity of our common condition. Because we cannot bear to be without this promise, we make
it. It is not the freest of our choices, but choice still. In possession of our gut understanding, we may
all move ourselves close and bind together in our urge to prolong and enjoy our navigation of the
world.
Thomas, you say that it is mutual forfeit—“mutuall transferring of Right”95—that guards this
promise.96 I must say more, that it is a mutual prolonged farewell. We cannot bear to relinquish the
meaningful world, so we earnestly hold the strings of it as best we can. We hold in our own hands the
tender threads, tender tethers between us and our loves. And with weight beneath our fingertips and
in our palms, isn’t it hard to doubt?
LXVIII
We hold not only the world but all meaning in tension, for we live meaningfully* in a meaning† world.
This is reality.
LXIX
My title ON EAGER TENTERHOOKS plays upon the idiom ON TENTERHOOKS, which suggests “a state
of painful suspense” in reference to cloth stretched and held in place by the hooks on tenter frames.97

* Fully, in that we make meaning.
† That is, in a world that means. Here I use MEANING as a gerundive, or present participle.
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Like fabric stretched firm for safe-drying, reality is held in tension; as is meaning. These threads in our
hands—of this fabric—are the same tethers keeping us together.
LXX
We have been traversing the celestial orbits of our existence, but now we must come back to the soil
of our planet, because it is no geocentric or heliocentric argument that occupies my day-to-day. It is
errands and emails and dead car batteries making me late for work.
Meaning is important in our arguments over grocery lists and in our attempts at a more
equitable and just world. Meaning asserts its gravity in the small and large impasses of our lives.
LXXI
Sometimes, my trusted mentors, when I hear you speak, I hear quavers in your voices that make me
wonder how well you trust in your own abilities to speak and be understood. This doubt is, of course,
understandable. Trust comes with doubt. Language is indeed a marvel. How do squiggles, sound
waves, and muscle contractions enrich our world in the ways that they do?
I think, in a certain way, that yours is not as simple as heartfelt doubt that you may speak and
be understood but that is an even greater heartfelt doubt in how we are to live together.
You see, already in the quavers of your voices you doubt in your own meaning, and meaning
is what we make that underlies all we do. But your doubt is not to be gotten rid of. Remember that
you doubt because we yearn to trust meaning and crave trust in how we are to live together. But do
not indulge the doubt that can never fully be in our hearts. It is only shallow doubt until you hesitate
to mean and to live among others; and if you do let it become deep doubt and let yourself retreat from
the courageous endeavor of living, then it will be deep doubt because you have let it be in your deeds.
In rejection of shallow doubt, let us embrace deep faith.
LXXII
My father mixes our names with the dogs’. My mother mangles even malaprops. My family interrupts
one another so often it is past funny. We skip words, mishear, half-say sentences, and remind each
other of whole stories with a mumbled word. It is our language. It matters. We mean it all.
Do your loved ones and you do the same?
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I have a deep intuition that understanding the ways in which we form meaning is crucial to
understanding how we are to live together—where to go for lunch, who to embrace, which values to
hold. In this light, meaning fabricates our very ability to live with and among one another.
LXXIV
Now is the moment to stretch. Come back to your body and your nerve endings, the rumble of hunger,
any scraping parchedness. And, when you are ready, we shall reorient and resume.
I hope you are well again, refreshed. Let us move on to a different sort of wrestling. So far we
have wrestled with our metaphysics, but let us get into play—into wrestling that handles our things,
actions, words, doubt, and faith in the ways they shape the lives we live. Let us turn our attention to
our meaning* and material lives.
LXXV
How do we tend to our things? For in this world, we have made many and beautiful things for
ourselves, and we have made ourselves many and beautiful things.
LXXVI
Take your hand and close it upon a nearby solidness: upon some matter. Close your fingers around
this matter so that in your hand there is weight. What is it? What is it when you call it by its thingly
name? Please tell me.
LXXVII
We frequently encounter multiple views, names for the same matter. Faced with

(bedeutung, that is,

reference) I can call it ANIMAL, CREATURE, BIRD, WATERFOWL (all signs with sinn, or sense) as easily
as I might call it DUCK.98 Suffice to say,

has no single correct name or meaning; it does not necessarily

connect to any word or meaning. Perhaps with the exception of onomatopoeia, no reference necessarily
connects to any name or meaning. This is the disconnect: the rift. At a basic level, this rift arises from
the fact that

BIRDSIGN

and the flying animal, i.e.,

differentiate between a bird and

* I use MEANING as a gerundive.

, are not one and the same. Here we must

, or the thing that we would call a

BIRD.

Though genetically
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identical, a bird (identified as such) already carries with it a connection between sign, bedeutung, and
sinn while

does not.
LXXVIII

We are nimble and generous name-givers. We convene for our naming ceremonies. We see as
manifoldly.* And I imagine our recipients of our glances blush under our affections. At least, I hope
they do. (I blush under our affections.)
LXXIX
Ludwig,† you say you see a duck as a rabbit and a rabbit as a duck.99 I hope I am clear that I am not
saying the same when I say that I move in the world, make myself draw lines on a page, and see my
markings as duck and as rabbit. But even so I see as myself, see as drawing, see as lines, see as a page. Is
this clear enough? It is difficult to say, for in speech we make and share our choices of vantage and in
speech we tend to the things that we make into things. Matter is, without words. Meaning is always
our doing: always doing, always active.
This is not so easy to grasp as mere arbitrary symbolism. This is not merely

and

DUCK,

though it is that too. This is, at the core, thing-hood. At a point, the matter we call grass was not grass,
it was only tangible. In language I attempt to press it into your palm by saying it was living matter. But
it simply was. And the conditions of life gave faculties to living things by which patterns linger in
memory and nutrients get species. The brains we’ve gotten for ourselves (and so many other creatures
for themselves) produce things as things. Birds and biologists know which berries not to eat. Not us‡
alone but life came to recognize the matter of our world as things, came to live in a world of things.
And still in all of this, life moved matter, formed it. Moves it, forms it. Not only do we engage with
matter as things (that is, not only do we engage with things) but we handle it too, reifying things in
our§ handling of them. So, we reify reality—the material and meaning** world we hold in tension. Not
only do we handle matter as things (that is, not only do we handle things) but we also build matter
into things. HOUSE may technically be our arbitrary (or at least flexible) thingly name for its matter;

* Seeing as or aspect seeing is the phenomenon where we contextualize objects and ideas differently in different contexts.
† Ludwig Wittgenstein.
‡ Sapiens.
§ Living beings.
** As material the world is uninterested in us—is carbon atoms—but as meaning the world is interested in us, in itself:
birds have their favorite trees and us our favorite birds. (I use MEANING as a gerundive.)
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however, someone built its matter into a house. Someone not only made it a house by name, but
someone made themselves a house.
LXXX
What we realize as we get at (near) meaning is how our thinking, action, living—vita contemplativa and
vita activa—are guided by the meaning and material world we live in. When simultaneously certain matter
is and things are, we can grasp that our lived experience takes place as much in the material medium
as in the medium of meaning. In loving examination and engagement with meaning we can appreciate
also that we make meaning, inexorably shaping this medium of our world even as we carve tunnels
through hillsides. Again, I say: When we appeal to language or meaning we appeal to ourselves and
the many ways we’ve meant and we mean, the many ways we’ve used and are using language. So, let
us not suppose false divinity to language. It is us.
LXXXI
The matter of our world, its material condition, does not ask us to deny ourselves the joy that we
engage in a world of things, merely asks us to be proud that we make them so.
So, you encounter a rock. Why is that collection of matter a rock? Why not a boulder? Pebble?
Why not a shard of a mountain? I say this not to have you doubt your way through the world. I say
this to bring you back to your gut understanding.
LXXXII
We see matter in a new light: we see, and we see as. And in this gut urge of ours to see the very same
matter as a thing and as two different things (that is, to see a thing and to see a thing as multiple things)
is our very urge towards play. Please, do not deprive yourself of playful elation.
LXXXIII
Ludwig, you ask: “Do I really see something different each time, or do I only interpret what I see in a
different way?”100 And you answer: “I’m inclined to say the former … To interpret is to think, to do
something; seeing is a state.”101, * But I ask: Is seeing really not doing? Is seeing really passive? Must
* May I observe, Ludwig, that your phrasing implies to “only” interpret is somehow less valuable than to “really” see,
which implicitly suggests that being more real makes them more valuable. So, the attachment you have to the
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the passive be separate from the active? And I answer: What we make or do is not separate from what
is given to us.
Matter is all that is given to us. All beyond matter we* make. Ludwig, you say we see
“something,”102 by which you get about as close as linguistically possible to pointing at the matter of
the thing. But this thing is yet matter. Matter is all that is given to us to fumble, play with, build.
Ludwig, you make it seem as though we have not managed to see the very same collection of atoms
as a thing (that is, that we have not managed to see a thing), let alone that we have managed to see it as
two different things. Beyond matter, we† make. Seeing is active: it is doing something. Seeing is not an
implicitly passive state.
LXXXIV
How can an account of seeing as be successful if it fails to recognize precisely what makes seeing as
remarkable?
While it is not rare that the same matter can be seen as two different things—this happens all
the time in life—Ludwig, you approach the phenomenon of seeing as with such an utter lack of surprise
that you miss how remarkable seeing‡ is itself. You miss how remarkable it is that we can make
meaning. But without surprise, Ludwig, how do you nourish your amazement? Do you nourish your
amazement? It is amazement that sustains me, sustains my gut urge so that I do not forget I am an
agile and ardent maker of meaning. If it is not amazement that we nourish, what will be the impetus
for us to remember that the atoms themselves are not suddenly different and to remember that those
atoms have a contingent, and not necessary, link to the thing we see and the things we see them as. Do
we want to make it so very easy for us to forget such vital deeds?

pursuit of tangible things leads you to have reflexive esteem for seeing real things and reflexive disregard for
interpretation. I find this worrisome, for it surrenders the acknowledgement of our agency and imagination in order
to strengthen the idea of objective or tangible reality. Also, I do recognize that we may read DIFFERENT as modifier
of either SOMETHING or SEE. However, given your use of ONLY and REALLY, I feel I can safely read DIFFERENT as
modifying SOMETHING.
* Here, WE is living beings.
† Living beings.
‡ Of course, regardless of sighted capacity this sort of seeing is available to all—it is metaphorically our capacity for
meaning.
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Ludwig, may I say that you seem afraid that if we let ourselves recognize that seeing and seeing as are
things that we actively do—perhaps even that we choose—then we may forsake our shared world?
Afraid that if these glimpses, flashes, lights of seeing as are not passive but instead active, then we may
recognize our own gut understanding and choose a particular incandescent hue, isolating ourselves in
those shadows away from others.
It frightens me too (and we can hold hands if it helps) but I take courage that this is the risk
of living and being alive. In being, in being appearing creatures, and in being appearing creatures
among fellows within a world warped by semblances – in living, we are courageous. The courage is
because of the risk. And I do not know what good it will do us to pretend that there is no risk, that
we are passive. I do not think any game of pretend will insure us against arrogant or timid choices,
against fearful exodus. Why not, then, tell ourselves what it is that we do so well?
It is not the thing that changes with the flitting of the light. We do not look at matter and have
things appear to us while we are in a state of seeing as. It is not simply that we are all subject to
unpredictable changes of light, so share in the same medium. It is not that when light changes with
no concern for our behest, we have a shared language, even if it is haphazard. It is not that we must—
by way of shared language—be among others.
LXXXVI
Ludwig, we are among others. No linguistic premise keeps us among others. We make that choice.
And no linguistic premise will prevent those who cannot bear the risk of a plural life, one that demands
courage, from secluding themselves. There is no logical or simple solution to our human, our living,
condition. There is only the important solution: that we must foster courage, bind ourselves to one
another in the tethers that last. Ludwig, we are among others, and it is so wonderful. We have theaters
and concert halls, and we collect birthday cards from our mailboxes.
Ludwig, we are among others. And we do not get to doubt that we are among others unless
we doubt it with our whole hearts, our every deed. To doubt that we are among others is to give up
birthday cards and Beyonce. Who do you know who is willing to do this? But even for those so willing,
no easy solution can protect our meaningful world, can keep us among others. We require an
important solution.
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But, first, let us applaud what we do so well: We look at matter and see things and then see as other
things. We create and choose particular ways of seeing in the ways we habitually navigate our world.
We make that world, we make ourselves and each other, we fill that world with plentiful items.
LXXXVIII
Seeing is active. Of course, activity and passivity sometimes meld—action can still be influenced by
predisposition—but this does not prevent us from recognizing the active nuance present in all our
seeing, in all our meaning.
Children so well fashion themselves their dolls houses out of whatever is at hand.103 And us
older, more wearied people see a child crouched over their wooden chest, immersed in imagination as
they move twined cornhusks as treasured friends. Through the child’s play we come to see as, though
they are seeing. A parent, focused upon getting dinner onto the table and, in the meantime, finishing
folding and putting away yesterday’s laundry might struggle more than us to see as, might resist this
childish seeing. Perhaps midway through the (inevitable) argument that the toys need to move because
that’s where the towels go, the parent might get a flashing glimpse of the chest as a dollhouse in full
turreted, Victorian glory. Perhaps.
This, I think, is not a reason to drag our heels in further that seeing, mean-ing, is passive. This
prompts us to realize how neglecting our gut urge—forgetting that we have such a gut
understanding—ennervates it.
LXXXIX
In any given moment, seeing and seeing as may not involve the sort of exercise of gut understanding,
urge—the feeling of doing something—that we are accustomed to having when we move our fingers
or legs. It may feel easy, like no effort at all. But I have practiced years for this ease. As have you,
Ludwig. As have all of us. I have babbled, put words and names to my world, learned a language,
grown my vocabulary, played with riddles, had my words and pronunciation and grammar corrected,
I have imbibed my alphabet, refined my motor skills, internalized my mother syntax and punctuation:
I have spent years speaking and living. I am not new at this. I have learned that my mother is not yours
and that we call her, think of her, by different names. The ease I feel proves my practice. I flick
between visions not because they are restless before me. I can flick between visions because I have
looked out at the world from hundreds of vantages, mistakenly seen as or not seen as more times and
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ways than I can count, and finally honed my reflexes into lightning acuity. In the given moment when
I feel at utter ease, let me remember the stubborn tears I shed not wanting to learn to read.
XC
Still sometimes, while I am cloud watching I feel that I see a whale unmistakably. I feel that. this. cloud.
is. a. whale. with. out. room. for. ar. gu. ment. Look. See?104
In these moments, things feel given. In these moments I
forget that this cheerful whale swimming in the blue sky is the fruit
of my efforts. (And the evolutionary efforts of many more beings
than I.)
XCI
Take the double cross105—an octagon divided by lines, which bisect each of its angles and converge
at its center, into triangles that are alternately shaded black and white.106
Ludwig, you say that this figure can be seen as a black cross on a white
background or as a white cross on a black background; you say this can
switch.107 Still you present seeing as as a sort of either/or. Either we see it as the
black cross, or we see it as the white cross.
XCII
But, Ludwig, when I look at the double cross, I see a bird’s-eye view of an umbrella. If I want, I can
see the black cross, and if I want, I can see the white. I can even switch rapidly back and forth between
the black cross and the white cross. Yet, I am not inclined to do so; I would much rather settle upon
seeing a bird’s-eye picture of an umbrella. Switching between the two crosses does not produce the
umbrella, like some sort of compromise; in fact, before I saw the figure as either cross, I first saw it as
an umbrella. However, switching between the crosses does highlight my desire to see the figure as I
wish because I remember that I do not need to make any switch at all. I can flip back and forth, or I
can see all of it … just somewhat differently. In seeing the umbrella, I get to include both the black
and white crosses as positive figures rather than relegate one or the other to being left out in the rain.
I get to: I choose to. I do. We cannot deny that we do, in fact, shape how we see things; we are not
completely at the mercy of shifting light. Indeed, we are not at the mercy of the shifting light.
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Earlier I asked: Do we want to make it so very easy for us to forget such vital deeds? Now, I ask: Do
we want to account for our ability to see an umbrella even when we are expected to see crosses?
Of course, we are constrained by the things we have yet encountered others make and the
things we have made, but we possess our gut understanding, urge as we determine the patterns and
habits of seeing that we wish to have. Sometimes someone else may point out the white cross before
we see it, but that does not diminish our imaginative capacity to stray from normative vision. This
seems, to me, the point. This is what we should not let ourselves forget. In fact, remembering our gut
urge will help us also remember that it is not the references that shift, but rather us, as we choose
which things to see and draw contingent links between atoms and meaningful language.
XCIV
Ludwig, I know we disagree. You say:
(The temptation is to say ‘I see it like this’, pointing to the same thing
for ‘it’ and ‘this’.) Always get rid of the idea of the private object in this
way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you don’t notice the
change because your memory constantly deceives you.108
While I understand why you approach seeing as in this way, I disagree that distrust (of ourselves and
the inner thoughts we may deceive ourselves of) is the solution. It can be easy to regard an intangible
sight as private—as a harbinger of exodus—but this in itself ought not make us wary of the intangible.
Ludwig, I think you are missing the point. Your focus on preventing even the slightest possibility of
private exodus leads you to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Is it so vital that there be absolutely,
positively, utterly no crevice for private language to survive? Are we willing to neglect our gut urge as
meaning makers and users of language?
Certainly, I am not.
XCV
My inclination is that meaning and attention are intimately connected. We hold reality—meaning* and
material—by our interaction, by engaging. We cultivate meaning in how we tend to the world.
Remember: reality is the claim on our thinking attention. We create realness in the very act of our
attending to our surroundings.
* I use MEANING as a gerundive.
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XCVI
Meaning is bound up in how we make our way, navigate through the world. A thing’s meaning—that
is, the meaning we give a thing—is bound up in how we interact with it: how we use it.
Donald,* you distinguish between the meaning of language and its use. Metaphor, you say,
deals only with use.109 Other ways of speaking, plain ways, assemble their meanings ‘truthfully’ but
metaphor and ways like it are ‘merely’ about interaction. But I disagree. Does—or can—meaning
persist without interaction? Donald, do the defined meanings of the words stay obediently in place
the way you say they do?
I ask: What is a thing’s meaning other than what the thing† strictly is? What is the meaning of
certain matter other than what the matter is?
XCVII
Let me, as best I can, summarize Troika’s 2013 sculpture Squaring the Circle by way of approaching this
question:110
Bent steel tubes wrapped in black, light-absorbent flock flannel
are seamlessly interconnected to form the contour of a continuous threedimensional polygon; this figure is suspended mid-air by nearly invisible
wires.111 Stand facing the sculpture head-on from one side and it appears
that an impeccably even and perpendicular square floats several feet off
the floor. Walk to the opposite side of the sculpture and face it head-on;
now a perfectly round circle appears to hover in the same place. All trace
of the square has vanished. Stop halfway between the two vantage points
and face the sculpture. From here, a three-dimensional polygon appears,
which traces the edges of the sort of shape that a ship’s sail would make if it was pinned by each of its
four corners and caught full of wind; that is, two horizontal parabolas meet two perpendicular,
sideways-vertical parabolas to intersect in four points that mark the corners of a square on an invisible
vertical plane.112

* Donald Davidson.
† Thinghood is, of course, already bound up in meaning, I use THING to get at what is not literally tangible in speech:
matter.
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(At this point, we have not yet given any bearing to the title SQUARING THE CIRCLE. But if we
do allow the matter this name, then we connect this matter with the idiom TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE,
meaning to do the impossible, that developed out of the unsolvable geometrical problem.)113
XCVIII
The matter of Squaring the Circle (its physical, tangible form) is best seen from the halfway vantage
point, for its skeleton is fully visible.* Neither the image of a square nor of a circle communicates what
hangs before the viewer. Even though no part of the sculpture is exactly hidden when it appears as a
circle or appears as a square, both the square and the circle are, in a sense, illusory. Yet, the sculpture’s
form visible at the halfway vantage has little to do with Squaring the Circle. Rather, Squaring the Circle is
almost entirely concerned with the two opposite shapes of a circle and a square.
Squaring the Circle’s physical form has significant relevance to the meaning of the sculpture only
how the sculpture accomplishes what it does without changing—it remains fixed. The meaning of
Squaring the Circle is beyond what it is beneath our palms, is beyond the matter. The meaning is that:
what the sculpture is urges us to place ourselves in multiple vantage points, reconcile each perspective,
and to, from there, consider the reconciliation of this plurality. Squaring the Circle demonstrates the
effort we exert when we make meaning.
XCIX
I could not see Squaring the Circle as a circle without physically positioning myself, that is, choosing to
pursue that sight. Nor could I see it as square without moving myself to that vantage point. Nor could
I appreciate the genius of the sculpture—that it is one seamless, static form—without choosing to
stand in the right spot. When we see as, we exercise an amazing capacity, gut urge. Unrelated to atomic
changes in our matter, we construct, deconstruct, and reconstruct new and different contexts in which
to see and find meaning in the same physical matter. This gut urge exists only in the intangible, shared,
meaning† world we have made together. When we understand how much of our lives depend on being,
moving, speaking together, how much can any of us really desire an exodus into private language?
How seriously are we willing to take this threat that some might desire private language?

* I say SKELETON here not to falsely prioritize the innards over appearance, but to convey the shape and matter of
Squaring the Circle.
† I use MEANING as a gerundive.
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Indulging this fear in the way you do, Ludwig, entertaining this desire to eradicate the
possibility of private language leads us to forget our gut urge and to ignore the ways we make and
remake the mutual (although intangible) world we construct together. Ludwig, remember that we get
no initial choice to be among others. This choice is only possible if we choose wholeheartedly to
relinquish our plurality with all its gifts; and, even then, I am not certain that such a choice is not death.
Tell me, do you bake all your own bread? Do you live your life honestly without company,
companions?*
C
Seeing as is among the jeweled crowning capacities of shared meaning. For there would be no
opportunity to see anything as something without there first being mutually habituated patterns of
seeing. Plural as we are, our engagement with others shapes our approach to understanding and seeing
the world—it makes different worlds out of the same matter. We are not passive in any of this nor
should we pretend to be. I fear that if we do, we encourage some misanthropic malcontents among
us to choose to isolate themselves so that they need not contend with the implications and courage of
their own intrinsically plural existence.
CI
What is meaning? My working idea is that meaning is a process of reconciliation. The Latin word
reconcilare, from which

RECONCILE

and

RECONCILIATION

derive,114, 115 is constructed of re- (“back,”

“backwards,” and “again”)116 and concilare (“to combine, unite physically in thought or feeling, … to
cause to meet”)117 from concilium (“convocation”), a compound of con- (“together”) and cal- (“to
call”).118 All put together, reconcilare is “to bring back into friendship or agreement, to bring back into
harmony, to win back, re-establish, restore.”119 Drawing upon Proto-Indo-European roots,
RECONCILE

roughly suggests: to bend back and call near again.120 Whatever rhyme or reason there

may have been for an initial assembly, to reconcile is to summon that gathering for the time being.
This, I think, speaks to the experiential evolution of language—how sounds and symbols attach to
meanings and objects only through patterned usage, and how (at least that we know) these patterns
may grow out of coincidence. I use the term

RECONCILIATION

to identify the process or act that

removes disconnect between two (or more) things that are intimately, but arbitrarily, related. To
* Etymologically: with bread—as in someone with whom you eat. Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “companion, n.1,”
March 2021, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/37402.
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reconcile is to enact this process. With this definition, I use RECONCILIATION much in the same way
we ordinarily do.
CII
Please forgive for the repetition, but once more:
We frequently encounter multiple views, names for the same matter. Faced with
I can call it
DUCK.

121

ANIMAL, CREATURE, BIRD, WATERFOWL

Suffice to say,

(bedeutung)

(all signs with sinn) as easily as I might call it

has no single correct name or meaning; it does not necessarily connect to any

word or meaning. Perhaps with the exception of onomatopoeia, no reference necessarily connects to
any name or meaning. This is the disconnect: the rift. At a basic level, this rift arises from the fact that
BIRDSIGN

and the flying animal, i.e.,

a bird and

, are not one and the same. Here we must differentiate between

, or the thing that we would call a BIRD. Though genetically identical, a bird (identified

as such) already carries with it a connection between sign, bedeutung, and sinn while
RECONCILE

does not. I use

to refer to the establishment of this intimate and arbitrary relationship between things,

which are not the same. In the case of

, we reconcile BIRDSIGN and the actual

.

CIII
Perhaps the peculiar challenge of philosophy of language is that language cannot acquaint us with the
matter of our world in any satisfactory substitute way to how actually living in the world can. But then,
the matter of our world is no satisfactory substitute for the meaningful, linguistic living we do. So, we
are constantly reaching, touching things to our lips and words, and extending our hands from lips to
our things. Children chase pigeons without regard for feathers in teeth. And we older children reach
out to let flying things, butterflies and hummingbirds, land as near to us as they are willing. We
reconcile urgently.
CIV
George,* you have the piercing insight that IS is immediate, but you have it the wrong way round when
you make

IS

principally an insistence upon identity rather than existence. You say: “I may discover

that XI is eleven, or that 11 is 7 + 4. Evidently such identifications do not intend to identify two terms
in their immediacy.”122 I would say that such identifications exactly intend to identify two terms in their

* George Santayana.
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immediacy. Perhaps I am confusing semantics, but immediacy strikes me as the most basic impulse of
these identifications. Almost as though we are placing counters in someone’s hand and pressing them
close to help communicate that these four marbles and these seven marbles are eleven marbles. (My
reader, how I wish I was near you, able to press a marble into your palm.)
And, George, you say:
The identity is that of John with himself, an intended and existing
object. The sound of his name and his image to sight are converging
symbols, both signifying the same living person … This term posited
as identical with itself, is removed from immediacy and belongs to a
plane of being believed in by me, which if my animal faith misleads me
need not exist at all.123
Again, is it not immediacy?
CV
My reader, I ask: “Where’s John?” You respond by pointing him out to me. The expressions of pure
demonstratives—pointed fingers, gestured waves—embody immediacy. In your response you are
trying to get me closer, you are literally reaching towards John.
CVI
George, you say: “the immediate is always with us.”124 But you say this to explain that we have such
interest in the choices we make between equivalent things because we experience equivalent things
and words differently. True—absolutely true. Fahrenheit orients me to our bodies where Celsius
orients me to the water I live off. However, it is immediacy that we are trying to grasp when we fumble
over these metric-to-imperial conversions. In some way, we are still pressing marbles into palms and
hoping that our meaning is made. We are touching, reconciling. These are tangible acts.
Even our word here, IMMEDIATE, conveys our meaning; it derives from the Latin immediātus,
which carries the sense: to not in the middle.125, 126 We cross the middle by our touches and reaches
and make there no middle.
CVII
George, you insist essences are not existence because they do not occupy space in the natural world127
and because essence is given-to-us— singular and set—while existence is in “the flux of nature.”128
(Of course, essences here are the rigid sort of things we can never get our hands on.) By this, you say
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meaning is not in existence. And by this, you say meaning is rigid, unchanging, and outside of “the
flux of nature.”129 So, you describe approaching a thing:
Its hidden nature, whatever it may be, is embodied in existence, and
turned from an eternal essence into a fact when it is caught somewhere
in the net of time, space, evolution, derivation, and association. Lying
myself in the same context, I can turn to it by groping; and on coming
into material contact with it, I may have rapid and varied intuitions
supplying me with various notes, in the terms of my personal senses
and emotions, which are my comment on it; perhaps it appears to be
something small, black, rapidly moving, and unpleasant. … But since
I have only my chance intuitions by which to describe that object, I am
tempted to assign existence, for the nonce to this accidental
description, as if it were the true essence of the thing.130
How beautifully you phrase this gripping process by which we, in the fluctuating world that we always
occupy, grapple and fumble with our surroundings. But then, George, you dismiss our grappling
account as well as our temptation to find existence in things which we touch and things which impress
and leave impressions upon us. You dismiss our temptation as though temptation is simply something
to resist. George, do you honestly want us alienated from our instinct towards immediacy as we wrestle
meaningfully?
CVIII
Our temptation to attribute existence to the things with which we grapple articulates the primacy of
tangible things, of immediacy. We desire to get close to the world around us and we reassure ourselves
of the world in touches and reaches and in pressing our discoveries into our palms to explore and
compare them. Although meaning is not matter, meaning is embodied in material gestures. Meaning
is indeed made.
CIX
Immediacy is not only a fundamental impulse—gut urge—but is also the means by which we make
meaning and engage linguistically. Expressions of pure demonstratives—pointed fingers, gestured
waves—convey immediacy and embody IS. If you are trying to tell me that the morning star is the
evening star, Hesperus is Phosphorous,131 is there any sentence more effective and apt than a pointed
finger extended either to sky or to star chart? It is more than mere emphasis that explains why we
point when we ask: “What’s that?” I am coming to think that our pointing may not only get at THAT
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but also at the contracted IS in our question. In our gestures, in our urge to gesture, we are doing our
best to reassure ourselves and our listeners that we are speaking about reality. Thus, we are referencing
continually back to existence—not in order to place stationary counters on fluctuating things but
rather to remind ourselves that the flux of our meanings entwines with the flux of existence such that
we cannot feasibly distinguish or separate either from the other. Each shapes the other. We navigate
meaning and existence by proximity and handholds.
CX
In making tangible meaning and meaning of tangible things, we are not limited to mere self-reference.
We are creative creatures. Much of the meaning we make involves simultaneous immediacy and
juxtaposition, juxtaposition and immediacy. We put a caterpillar next to a butterfly, we point between
a newborn and a stomach, and then we verbalize these same gestures in increasingly complex ways.
CXI
In language, though we are often touching, we are also so often pointing.
CXII
Again, under the Flammarion-sky132 you stand on grass, a rocky chasm before you at the tips of your
toes, so wide you are not certain you can leap to the opposite bank. It is wide enough you could not
materially cross it. Standing beside you, you have your interlocutor with you. You know precisely the
bit on the opposite bank to which you want to get your interlocutor and yourself. But you cannot
safely get yourselves there materially. The rift is wide. So, by gesture, you get at that place, drawing on
all you have done yet alive. You cast towards the other bank so that your interlocutor may get there
with you. You cast without any thrown projectile: gesture and motion only. And you trust that your
gesture will be enough.
CXIII
Our pointing seems the theme, my mentors, of your problems and cases.
To answer these questions of identity, which in life we resolve tangibly, you devoted
philosophers search for lasting mathematical equations. But equations enervate our basic gut urge.
Stable equations lure us into passivity as though we may sit by and let the symbols and syntax sort
themselves out. Mathematics is not life. And these hiccups in language that you labor over, my
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mentors, these hiccups are not the problems you treat them as. You struggle with the tenuous link
between the linguistic and the material world because the world is linguistic and material. It resists your
easy solutions. We do not live by equations, by Q.E.D. In life, an equals sign cannot fix the
referencetangibly. Rather, we call out to one another, pen our names, change them even, remind
ourselves where the oft-misplaced keys go, and baptize our children, gifting them names they can be
proud to wear. We point out each other. We engage plurally. Saul,* do we not?133
These problems you—we—labor over require lived solutions, important fixes not Q.E.D.
ones. I think it is time we pull Pierre out of his misery and tell him about London. 134
CXIV
Hiccups are not problems. I say this so you may prepare to see that which so trouble you, not at
problems and mistakes but rather as opportunities.
CXV
We cast and point in strange and generous ways. As we wander and navigate the world with varied
interlocutors and companions beside us, we encounter unfamiliar places and return to even familiar
places anew, by myriad approach and reapproach. We become habituated but are always novitiates.
The successes of our pointing come from our resilience and persistence, not from safe attempts.
CXVI
You stand on grass, overlooking a rocky chasm. Beside you stands your interlocutor. And you know
precisely the spot on the opposite bank to which you want to get your interlocutor and yourself. So
you cast.
Now sometimes the chasm you attempt to cross is hardly noticeable—a crack—and
sometimes is a canyon. Sometimes you cast six different ways, triangulating twice between the
surroundings to get at your sought spot on the other bank. Other times your arc lands precisely and
your interlocutor and you find that your lob has flung both of you, with it, to where you were pointing.
We cast in exacting and missed arcs. You smile, your feet firm upon fresh, untrodden grass.

* Saul Kripke.
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I admit, my mentors, that this pointing and casting business is tricky and we may get some gestures
wrong. I promise we will. This business of identity, immediacy, and reconciliation is tricky too. I
promise you we will get some names wrong. But again, this is the endeavor of living. These are the
risks we take.
From this it does not follow that all appearances are mere semblances.
Semblances are possible only in the midst of appearances; they
presuppose appearance as error presupposes truth. Error is the price
we pay for truth, and semblance is the price we pay for the wonders of
appearance. Error and semblance are closely connected phenomena;
they correspond with each other.135
Error, semblances, mistakes, feeble throws, and missteps onto our quaking bogs abound. They always
will.
CXVIII
Error, semblances, mistakes, feeble throws, and missteps abound and trouble us philosophers of
language deeply. My mentors, sometimes I hear quavers in your voices that make me wonder how
well you trust in your own abilities to speak and be understood. My mentors, sometimes I worry that
you do not contend well with such missteps. You turn to your scribblings, equations, and your maps.
So occupied are you—are we—with finding a steady, lasting solution that we often overlook the
important fix.
CXIX
My mentors, I said at the beginning that you have inscribed well in all of us that language is a medium
in which we seek to communicate truths about the world to each other with as little interference as
possible. You have inscribed this so well in yourselves. My mentors, I watch you searching for the
objects of meaning and language: for meaning and language as objects. You think they stay in place.
And again, I recall the story you tell, Jorge Luis:*
… In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection
that the map of a single Province occupies the entirety of a City, and
the map of the Empire, the entirety of the Province. In time those
Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers
* Jorge Luis Borges.
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Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire,
which coincided point for point with it.136
My mentors, not only does this map obscure the grass and prevent our dancing but it will
forever miss its mark. For the blades of grass move with the wind and beneath our feet; and, when we
take a breath from this metaphor, we must admit we know ourselves too well to think the stubborn
and precocious among us will not lift up the corners of our cartography and insist on dancing.
CXX
And yet, my mentors, you commission ambitious cartography. I watch you do this, and I wonder what
you are after, what will finally satisfy you. Do you even know?
George, set yourself after a near-fanatical search and survey, which I fear could fatigue even
the indefatigable. You say:
Whether the claim to existence made on behalf of any object is just or
not is a question that can never be decided by analyzing the given
description of what is said to exist, but only by exploring the flux of
nature, by experience or testimony, until the region in which the
existing thing is alleged to lie (for if it exists it must lie somewhere) is
thoroughly explored, and I can judge whether my original description,
granting my terms and my circumstances, was a fair description of
what actually lies there.137
And that:
A very inadequate designation of the object … may be perfectly correct
and sufficient for human purposes; but the places and times … in
which the existence of such an object would be unmistakably
manifested must be definitely fixed; otherwise the existence of the
object, the very point in question, would not be broached at all; for it
is idle to say that a thing does or does not exist; if I do not say when
or where it is to be met with in the world of action.138
Yes, the claim to existence is not decided by analysis. But George, the claim to existence relies
on trust—faith—rather than upon complete and comprehensive cross-checking of descriptions and
data. The life you ask of us is not one I can abide. And, yes, partial designations do suffice for us. But,
George, we do not require exacting instruction and explanation to find our way to the things in our
world. I get most places I intend to go just fine. George, where do you seek to go that you get so lost?
That you cling to maps so strongly?
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CXXI
My mentors, you set yourselves after highly demanding surveys, catalogs, and then revisions of our
existent and linguistic lives. I cannot abide the life you ask of me, for I get where I am going too well
to muster the doubt you have. More, I worry about the obsessive revision your conclusions seem to
demand.
I think that we can get trust in existing things without first needing dictionary- or encyclopediaready accounts of them. My simple engagement and closeness—my immediacy—with things most
often suffices. In life, we do not require the formal agreement we sometimes prefer in our philosophy
for its comfort it brings us. In life, functional agreement—how we interact with things and one
another—very often gives us the trust we need.
CXXII
If it is not cartography or equations we consult, how then do we trust ourselves with meaning, with
language? How do we muster our faith? If it is all so tenuous, how do we sustain our courage for this
faith?
CXXIII
You stand on grass and cast across the chasm with only the faith that you will make your meaning and
that if you do not—as you may not—you may still attempt anew.
CXXIV
We cast with only the faith that we will make our meaning and that, if we do not, we may attempt
anew. We warrant out faith through practice and through misstep.
CXXV
My mentors, I hear the quiet quavers in your voices. I am sorry to wrest you from your certainty and
stability. Please know, I do this because it is important. It is important, first, that you love yourselves
proudly for all that you do. It is important that we all recognize what we do so we may love ourselves
proudly for all that we do. But also, it is important because your doubt is not only about your words.
Your doubt, my mentors, is about how we are to live together. This is why we must forge forward
onto quaking bogs, courageous without certainty.
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CXXVI
My mentors, I must ask you to relinquish your equals signs and to honestly and openly delve into
meaning. Let us not begin where you are comfortable. Plain language has got its due many times over.
Though we cast always—plainly and playfully—we are so accustomed to the narrow hurdles we
hop that we usually do not notice our own leaping. Playful language refuses to be ignored, demands our
attending, insists we take pride in our own agility. Let us look at playful language so we must contend
with our casting. In the material and meaning world we occupy, playful language points and touches no
differently than we do. We are looking at nothing else but ourselves.
CXXVII
Donald, you ask: “If metaphor has special cognitive content why should it be so difficult or impossible
to set it out?”139 And I can only laugh.
I laugh, Donald, because you think that meaning is different from use. You say that metaphor
continues to refer to the ordinary meanings of its words.140 You say that metaphor has a force that
outlasts the sheer intrigue of ambiguity.141 You say metaphor requires a change to how its words are
taken.142 You say that metaphor cannot be too apparent.143 You say that metaphor has no one concrete
interpretation attached to it, but rather intimates many. You say that metaphor operates via the same
conventions as ordinary (plainer) language.144 So, metaphor has no special railways built for it. But then,
Donald, you go and say that metaphor ought to be evaluated as true or false.145 And so you say that:
“What distinguishes metaphor is not meaning but use.”146 I laugh because you are mistaking meaning.
CXXVIII
You ask, Donald: “If metaphor has special cognitive content why should it be so difficult or impossible
to set it out?”147 Then you ask: “why should it be that when we try to get explicit about what it means,
the effect is so much weaker?”148And you follow these with a third question: “Finally, if words in
metaphor bear a coded meaning, how can this meaning differ from the meaning those same words
bear in the case where the metaphor dies—that is, when it comes to be part of the language?”149
To your first question: The fact that something is hard to do is not a strong enough reason to
conclude that it cannot be done. To both your first and second questions: Is it really that important to
precisely parse whatever it is that metaphor communicates? You presume that if there is a special
cognitive content of metaphor, then you should be able to set it out explicitly. In a certain way, I think
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this points to fundamental aspects of human curiosity. We want to see and grasp the objects of our
interest. It is frustrating when we cannot. Nevertheless, in another way, your presumption points to
philosophy of language’s logical roots. Roots that, unless we challenge them, predispose us to expect
that the objects of our thoughts will (and should) possess singularity, permanence, and stasis. To your
third question, my reply is much the same: Language is flexible. Philosophers of language cannot deny
this, and we actually have a responsibility to account for this elasticity.
CXXIX
Donald, you say: “as much of metaphor as can be explained in terms of meaning may, and indeed
must, be explained by appeal to literal meanings of words.”150 You say this the way I would say: As
much of meaning—the engagement we do—is inexorable from our appeals to the matter of our world.
But, you see, Donald, we do not say the same.
Meaning is not fixed and is not any literal object. You say that we use meaning—that meaning
is different than use—because you see meaning as an object. Donald, do you not make appeals to
literal meaning? And you too, George? You say: “Words … are wise men’s counters.” 151 And also:
“Language is a by-product of animal life which may eventually serve as a record or as an instrument.”152
You think they stay in place. You think they lie await for you somewhere, if only you can find them.
CXXX
My mentors, I watch you searching for the objects of meaning and language: for meaning and language
as objects. You think that if you search enough, survey correctly, then you shall find these bejeweled
meanings lying in wait for you, scattered to the ends of the Earth. Donald, George, my mentors, you
will never be satisfied.
My trusted, trusted mentors, you make these appeals to literal meaning and language. You see
language and meaning as things of the sorts of things that stay put where we place them. In my
experience meaning rarely stays put. Still, I sympathize with your impulse. How lovely to imagine that
beautiful set, given-to-me treasure lies hidden for me to dig it up. Alas, it is not so.
CXXXI
I laugh again, Donald, when you say: “intimation is not meaning.”153 How is it that you have so little
faith in us?
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Donald you struggle to explain how metaphor manages to get recognized as a different sort of usage
and to carry a special “force.”154 It being difficult, you resort to your tried and traditional truth values.
So, you propose that: “Generally it is only when a sentence is taken to be false that we accept it as
metaphor and start to hunt out the hidden implication.”155 However, “patent truth” sometimes also
joins “patent falsity” in this.156 Thus: “Absurdity or contradiction in a metaphorical sentence
guarantees we won’t believe it and invites us, under proper circumstances, to take the sentence
metaphorically.”157 Oh-so-generously, Donald, you do not deny us metaphorical truth, only deny that
sentences have metaphorical truth158 You grant us this leeway, however, only because you find “no
reason … not to say” metaphor leads us to notice things that are true or false.159
Donald, I am very puzzled by you. Have you read Emily Dickinson? Laughed at Shakespeare’s
innuendos? You must have felt the elation—utter fun—of play and playful language. And still, you
maintain your desire to contextualize all language use within a valuative system?
You tell us that if a metaphor can be found true or false in the ordinary sense, “then it is clear
that it is usually false.”160 You say, I think, cavalierly, that in the ordinary sense “all similes are true and
most metaphors are false.”161 Yes, lest we spoil it, the out-of-the-ordinary significance, if not special
meaning of metaphor cannot be made “all too obvious and accessible.”162 Yes, to reduce metaphor to
merely similarities trivializes it, since “everything is alike, and in endless ways,”163 And yes, metaphors
must be more than newly-coined definitions so that it does not become the case that “to make a
metaphor is to murder it.”164 Yes, metaphor carries a special force.165 But, no! It is not patent falsity, or
patent truth that makes us take a phrase as a metaphor.
CXXXIII
“The ships hung in the sky in much the same way that bricks don’t.”166 And, Donald, would you tell
me that this is mere patent truth—so obvious we know to not take it as truth? Because I want to tell
you that so much more is happening here.
CXXXIV
You search for this special force in stable, singular and set objects: in words alone, without even our
exertion of inhalation, exhalation. Donald, you lack faith in us.
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It is not a matter of interpretation that makes us take a sentence as a metaphor. There is not a hidden,
special meaning in the words of a metaphor; for words are not the literal objects that you appeal to,
Donald. Instead, we are cued to extraordinary context. So, what is it that cues us?
I think it is a markedly different thing to say that we are cued to metaphorical (or playful)
context than it is to say that we take something as metaphorical. Donald, in being cued for the
extraordinary, our sense of surprise persists—I can know something special is happening, but this
does not give me over to any formula for interpretation nor to any singluar and set determination on
what is happening. I can yet discover a metaphor, then rediscover it as a pun, then rediscover it again,
and again. Contrastly, hunting out the hidden directs us to take a ruthlessly analytic approach to
interpreting the metaphor. Donald, extraordinary is not the same as either falsity or obviousness. Sure,
patent falsity or patent truth167 may cue us but they are not the only things that can do so. Plenty of
statements still invite us to be playful even though they are neither false nor so obviously true as:
Hesperus = Hesperus.
CXXXVI
Rather than interpretation it is anticipation that cues us to not only playful language but also plainer
language and meaning itself. Donald, I laughed because intimation is meaning.
CXXXVII
Donald, you are right when you say: “When we try to say what a metaphor ‘means,’ we soon realize
there is no end to what we want to mention.”168 You scoff at the notion that “with a metaphor is a is
a cognitive content that its author wishes to convey and that the interpreter must grasp if he is to get
the message.”169 But you say this all wrong, as though associated non-literal meaning produces a THE
automatically.
This does need not be an impasse, Donald, and you need not “give up the idea that metaphor
carries a message, that it has a content or meaning (except, of course, its literal meaning).”170 Donald,
you need not banish the poets.
CXXXVIII
Donald, you deny the existence of any hidden message in metaphor on the basis that “it is so hard to
decide … exactly what the content is supposed to be.”171 You prize so highly the truth values of your
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words that you place additional tax upon language for its playfulness. Because language that plays is
more difficult to evaluate, you let the intricacy of its success go unacknowledged and unappreciated,
as you do the effort of its audience.
CXXXIX
It is precisely the existence of a hidden meaning and the difficulty in discerning it, that leads me to
believe that metaphor, humor, and playful language as a whole have a hidden complexity.
No, this is not to say that there is necessarily a single hidden message to be grasped in order
for the listener to understand the ‘real’ meaning of playful language.* In fact, there is no the real meaning.
Rather, this is to say that there is something hidden. Yet,

THING

is the wrong term. There is not a

message to be read; and we should not unnecessarily assume singularity nor set concreteness. Perhaps
the better way to say it might be: There is some hiddenness. Or: There is some opportunity for
uncovering.† Even better: We have an opportunity to uncover.
CXL
Either confusion or surprise or even the vague feeling that something is up, something is happening—
think: mulling over a joke and getting it five minutes after—cues us to notice the rift and find a way
to reconcile it. In our casting and pointing, we cue.
CXLI
You have no faith, my mentors, in this pointing.
George, you say: “Words … mark some gain or wager of thought.”172 And: “Significant speech
is a lasso thrown into the air, lucky if it catches some living thing by a leg or by a horn.”173 Is it lucky
that a poet, dedicated to their craft, plucks at their audience’s soul? Is it lucky that I—more than two
decades practiced at this linguistic capacity I evolved for, and which evolved for me—get my meaning
across in words? I do not think this is luck. Like me, you recognize the tenuous success of language,
but are you not also somewhat waiting for these bets to fall through? Although I too notice when our
linguistic hopes do not match up, I do not see fallen bets as failures.

* There is no singular or set meaning.
† Uncovering is not limited, as discovery is, to one the first experience. Rather, uncovering allows for continuous
discovery and rediscovery.
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All speech, meaning, language—not just the significant—involves casting into open air. But
in playful language we notice our movements for we move differently. We move in ways that ask to be
noticed if our cast is to aim well. Please, do not forget that plain language is tenuous too. Unless you
relinquish the richness of your life gifted by playful language, you do not get to trust one and not the
other. We honor no shallow doubt.
CXLII
You have no faith, my mentors, in our casting. Without faith, you are right: it is presumptuous for any
poet—given all the variability of word use—to anticipate how their audience will receive a metaphor.
Without faith, how does Squaring the Circle, imbued with only fabric and metal and (if we allow
it) a nice title, manage to so routinely evoke curiosity and synthesis in its audience? There is nothing
in what the sculpture is—the matter—that does this. The answer, I think, is that the meaning of a
thing—thinghood itself, really—cannot be separated from its use and our interaction with it. In this
case, meaning is something more than the flat features of words or materials or mere convention—
something more than the literal. Meaning is something beyond what the thing strictly is. Use cannot
be cleaved from meaning.
CXLIII
Donald, you miss what Ludwig sees: that meaning is bound up in use, that meaning is not singular
and set. But you, too, Ludwig, fail to free us from passivity, from meanings given-to-us.
Ludwig, you describe how, on one playing of a minuet, you could “get a lot out of it,” and on
another playing of the same minuet, you could “get nothing out of it.”174 You observe that this effect
upon the listener (or even performer) need not be distinct from the thing itself: “it doesn’t follow that
what you get out of it [the minuet] is then independent of the minuet.”175 Meaning need not remain
consistent, meaning may rise in tandem with use. As such, meaning is linked with use, context, effect.
Meaning, interaction, and reaction are all related. But still, you say they are changing before you:
(The temptation is to say ‘I see it like this’, pointing to the same thing
for ‘it’ and ‘this’.) Always get rid of the idea of the private object in this
way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you don’t notice the
change because your memory constantly deceives you.176
Ludwig, you keep us passive.
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Ludwig, your contributions should not content us with passive analysis, the eager pointing at the
details of our cases and contexts. It ought to pound agency—gut understanding—into our bones as
we reckon with the world we are part of. If truth is what we are after, then perhaps we slink back to
you, Donald. But as we realize we have spoken our world and its pillars into existence, then perhaps
we ought to consider that our faculties and deeds are indeed where our focus should be. We attend to
the world and shape it.
CXLV
You stand on grass, your interlocutor beside you. You cast as you look out at the rocky chasm before
you. You cast and get your interlocutor and yourself onto the opposite bank. But remember that this
is a fabric place and your casts do shape it as well, changing everything including that very position on
the opposite bank which you were aiming at.
CXLVI
The falling out of our casting, pointing meaning – its tenuous success should not shake our faith that
casting and point may launch us across the chasms we face. The successes of meaning affirm our faith
as do failures, for they assure us that it is faith.
CXLVII
I believe the difference between simile and metaphor is the difference between meaning and Meaning.
I propose that there is a difference between ordinary meaning (lowercase meaning) and specialized
Meaning (uppercase meaning). All language requires reconciliation, but playful language requires an outof-the-ordinary reconciliation.
Even in your framework, Gottlob,* language is still a symbolic medium that requires us to
reliably connect sinn to its sign and to connect both sign and sinn to their correspondent bedeutung. (If
I want to speak about the moon on a cloudy night, I have no demonstratum177 visible to the naked
eye to which I can appeal; I rely on a connective bond between sign, sense, and reference.)
In plainer language we develop expectations for how we should reconcile unconnected (or, not
obviously connected) words, meanings, and things. These expectations are flexible and in constant

*

Gottlob Frege.
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flux, but they retain a certain durability, aided by social conventions, linguistic habits, and formal
grammatical systems. However, sometimes—deliberately or inadvertently—our use of language defies
and/or evades our expectations. At these times, in order to reconcile the rift in language, we begin to
examine the systems that we typically rely upon to ease the struggle of meaning-making. This
reconciliation and the extensive examination that it requires us to engage in may be, in part, what
allows humor (a kind of playful language) to function so effectively as a weapon against hypocrisy and
dogma. Doubt and revaluation of ingrained expectations become tools to feed our hunger for
reconciled meaning.
CXLVIII
I propose, Donald, that we exchange your term
COGNITIVE EFFORT

SPECIAL COGNITIVE CONTENT

for

SPECIAL

so we may refocus our attention on what is actually happening in metaphor—in

all playful language. Playful language asks us to make a special type of reconciliation; it requests we exert
ourselves, make special cognitive effort, before it will be made sense of. And this special effort is that
we notice we are making the extra effort. Just as it becomes harder to walk or ride a bike when we
notice and think about what we are doing as we do it, it takes special effort to make meaning while
also noticing and thinking about how we are making that meaning. To clarify, playful language does not
so much cause us to make this special effort as playful language is the sort of language whose meaningmaking begs to be noticed and who thrives only with our attention.
Donald, you want to know what is uncovered, you want to find the special cognitive content.
I want to feel, emphasize the rooting, digging, delving; so

SPECIAL COGNITIVE EFFORT

emphasizes

that we exert effort to uncover. It is the uncovering that is important. Let us, then, acknowledge and
appreciate our effort. Special cognitive effort translates into how expectations are formed, maintained,
and challenged, and then what emerges from that challenge.
CXLIX
A. M.,* you argue that making sense of language is not only a matter of interpretation but also a matter
of expectation. You say:
In the natural use of language words do not stand for precise meanings,
but only offer hints which a hearer must interpret by intelligent
guesswork. Somebody utters a sentence and we seek to understand
* A. M. MacIver.
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what he means by it; knowledge of the conventions of the language
tells us … only that in a large range of possible meanings there is an
order of preference … out of all the possible meanings we have to
guess which the speaker intended to use by the evidence at our
disposal. Commonly we do this immediately, for commonly we know
what sort of thing a speaker wants to say even before he says it.178
Expectation, built through experience, supports all meaning. Even more, it demonstrates how,
at heart, meaning requires our participation; meaning and use can never be separate. We have
expectations all the time, and all the time we exert ordinary effort in order to make sense of the
language we encounter. So, it goes for plainer language. For playful language we engage in special cognitive
effort and notice our own effort: creation, frustration, perspiration.
CL
There is a story told about the artist Agnes Martin that I like, which illustrates how attention gives rise
to meaning:
The little girl [Isobel] was holding onto a rose … Agnes Martin took
the rose and said to the girl, “Is this rose really beautiful?” And Isobel
said yes. And then Agnes Martin hid the rose behind her back and said,
“Is the rose still beautiful?” “Yes,” said Isobel. And then Agnes Martin
said, “You see, Isobel. Beauty is in your mind, not in the rose.”179
Agnes, you insist upon giving us agency. The rose is what it is, and it is intimately-related to the
meaning we make—this meaning is part of it. But we make the meaning. Our attention, sensation, and
memory drive any act of meaning-making.
CLI
Hannah, you reference Gertrude Stein’s line: “Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.”180 And you say:
“Something smells like a rose, tastes like pea soup, feels like velvet, that is as far as we can go. ‘A rose
is a rose is a rose.’”181 You speak about language’s limited ability to directly express the actual character
of things, even as our senses immediately understand the feeling of a rose petal, its vivid color, its rich
scent. Nonetheless, “rose is a rose is a rose” gets exactly at the issue of meaning beyond the thing
itself.
Gottlob, you talk of Hesperus and Phosphorous.182 Is there any clearer assertion of identity or
meaning than A = A = A = A? “Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.”183 But I think that in skilled hands
A = A = A = A tells us as much as A ≠ A = A ≠ A. Nimble fingers or tongues can turn this seeming
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equivalence on its head and make it suddenly speak about the duality of being (and meaning)—at the
same time—both more than a rose and only a rose. One way to understand “a rose is a rose” is to
acknowledge that even the roses sprouting from the most florid sonnets are merely blossoms of prickly
shrubs. But “a rose is a rose is a rose” suggests something different; it says, that despite the romance
about it, a rose is a flower on a thorn bush; then it reminds us that the literal rose on a thorn bush is
still a rose, which continues to hold onto its glorified and romanticized context.
CLII
We can neither describe what something is without appealing directly to that thing, but since a thing
exists in the larger context of the world, we cannot speak about its meaning without appealing to the
ways in which our interaction with it (and use of it) forms its meanings. There is no Truth to the thing
for anyone to grasp. We can only make its meaning through interacting with it.
CLIII
Ludwig, you recount your experience reading Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock’s poetry. Upon finally
getting what it was Friedrich was doing, you say: “when I read it in this particular way, intensely, I
smiled, said: ‘This is grand,’ etc. But I might not have said anything. The important fact was that I read
it again and again.”184 This is an incredible statement: “The important fact was that I read it again and
again.” In saying this, you assert that the most authentic affirmation of value is not in our statements
but in the dedication of our attention, if not other resources such as time and money, to it. You follow
up on this claim when you introduce the term APPRECIATION185 as a way of speaking about all manner
of unqualified and qualified aesthetic judgments. We convey appreciation in giving time and attention
to the object of our appreciation.
CLIV
Meaning relates not simply in parallel but in connection with the effect of art. Ludwig, you say: “One
asks such a question as ‘What does this remind me of?’ … Various things are suggested; one thing, as
you say, clicks.”186 I think that perhaps the most common experience of this click comes in that
moment when that flash of insight causes you to finally seize upon the evasive word that had been at
the tip of your tongue. This click is the sign of satisfaction that indicated “the right thing has
happened.”187 So, there is an intuitive sense of aesthetic satisfaction that we recognize. Aesthetic
reactions lie along the path to this satisfaction. Aesthetic discontent is expressed as: “Make it higher …
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too low! … do something to this.”188 In this way, aesthetic discontent prompts us into action with the
aim of that click!—it is the need to “do something to this.” By contrast, aesthetic discomfort refers more
to feeling dissatisfaction with something, rather than the need to create satisfaction.
Aesthetic discontent prompts us to try to find a resolution—to achieve the click. I think that
curiosity may be akin to discontent, and that is precisely what gives Squaring the Circle its force in
prompting us to walk the whole way around it. It is what urges us to place ourselves in multiple vantage
points, to reconcile each perspective, and from there to consider the reconciliation of the plurality of
vantages. The sculpture and what happens around it—what we do, how we interact—comprise the
meaning of Squaring the Circle. Its meaning extends beyond what it strictly is. Meaning emerges as we
tend to our world.
CLV
Though often translated as IMITATION, mimēsis has no true English equivalent; in order to get at mimēsis,
we must understand action and our capacity for meaning-making. Aryeh,* you differentiate between
mimesis and the sort of ordinary meaning-making that occurs in everyday language use:189 “poetic
activity … is founded on more than the concern with the arbitrarily signifying powers of language. T
he more … is iconic imitation, mimesis.”190 Mimesis is not mere

and DUCK (though it is that too).

Aristotle, you acknowledge that the preconditions of poetry, our propensity for mimesis and
our pleasure at recognizing mimetic objects—are the reasons why we bother to write at all.191 We
require an initial familiarity with an object to allow us to later grant it the status of mimetic object;
without such familiarity we can only derive pleasure from craftmanship, color, or the like, but not
from mimetic recognition.192 It would seem to follow that the satisfaction of recognition—
reconciliation—is what gives us pleasure. Is mimesis merely symbolic recognition? (For example, the
knowledge that although ceci n’est pas une pipe,193 it is precisely that.) If so, the pleasure of mimesis ought
to be possible in all instances of recognition. Certainly, when recognition is new to us (such as the first
time a kindergartener reads and comprehends on their own), we do derive pleasure from our
accomplishment. However, over time, as such recognition becomes commonplace, this pleasure fades.
It is more, then, that mimesis is even as it is intertwined with our instinct for symbolism.
Rather, than symbolism, the loosely-termed imitation of a word to its reference, mimesis gets
at imitation as an active capacity: to imitate.

* Aryeh Kosman.
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CLVI
Aristotle, you tell us: “mimetic artists portray people in action.”194 You apply MIMESIS broadly, but you
linger on its poetic utility.195 So, already, you assume that mimesis operates in a fictive sphere. This is
crucial. Not only does a fictive sphere separate mimesis from ordinary symbolism, it sets the
parameters for the way in which mimesis is active. Mimesis as action is essentially linked to the fictive
sphere.
Aristotle, you say mimesis is at its most perfect form in tragedy, when it is mimetic poetry that
represents a serious and a complete action that provokes katharsis of pity and fear.196 At its most
perfect, Aristotle, you see mimēsis urging us towards katharsis. No single line of dialogue nor even a
heart-wrenching soliloquy elicits catharsis; the whole tragedy, as a complete and unified action,197 must
generate catharsis. It is the action that moves us, not simply pretty words.
CLVII
Of course, action on stage is not the same action that any of us take in our daily lives. We view tragic
action only through a “small fixed window”198 into an invented world, but still we are still genuinely
moved and shaken. Perhaps mimesis is the fictional duplication of real-world action that maintains its
emotional magnitude throughout this conversion, but I am inclined to say it is something else.
Rather than converting real-world action to fictional action (while preserving its poignance),
mimesis produces original fictive action. If we think of the poet as a child, we should not look for
mimesis in the accuracy of the invented world. Dolls need not have the miniaturized dexterity of a
person for them to mimetically grasp the hilt of the sword and slay the dragon; and the dragon need
not imitate any real species in our known world for it, inside of child’s play, to truly breathe fire.
Instead, the poet imbues their craft with mimetic action through their act of creation. As with toys,
the actual action figures have little to do with the plot or with the meaning of the play; in make-believe
a cornhusk might as effectively be the heroine as a perfectly-proportioned animatron.
CLVIII
Mimesis concerns a fictional world related to our world by agency—gut urge—rather than by
duplication.199 So, Aryeh, you invoke the poet Marianne Moore: “The poet creates an imitation speaker
who makes real speeches in the imitative world, ‘imaginary gardens with real toads in them,’ … not
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imaginary toads in gardens that are real.”200, 201 As such, the real character of mimesis (and structured
storytelling) is the consistent condition of agency throughout the action.
CLIV
Within this context, catharsis is something else than emotional release. Tragedy forces us to examine
unexpected, unintended consequences of action, and—even more—unexpected, unintended actions.
By means of reversal and recognition, suddenly Oedipus has bedded his mother. What is done is
already in the past, but it takes on changed meaning. This is daunting because it fundamentally
challenges the assumption of agency we carry throughout our lives. While typically thought of as
purgative, Aryeh, you stress the lustrative purpose of catharsis.202 Of course this is not to say catharsis
cannot be purgative, but that purgation is not its primary aim. For catharsis to occur, a tragedy must
elicit fear and pity in its audience, but this is not the specific fear that we too will bed our parents, nor
is it pity for Oedipus’s exploits in this area. Rather, it is the general fear that “goodness of character
and goodness of deliberation can lead, not simply to disastrous consequences, but to disastrous actions on
the part of the agent.”203 And it is pity that the characters, like us, have this same lot.
CLV
In normal everyday activity we rely upon a belief in our own agency: that we are capable of action,
that we are in control of our own actions, that we can understand our actions, and that we can direct
our actions effectively towards our own aims. We have faith in our gut urge. That is, we have a need
to trust in our ability to expect the consequences of our actions. Within fictive worlds, internal plot
necessity and basic causal chains establish expected consequences. It is the strata of unexpected
consequences that we grapple with when we consider reversal, recognition, and catharsis. Reversal is
the mutation by which the action itself changes in character; and recognition is the character’s
realization of this. Through reversal and recognition, we recognize that action has changed, and must
reconcile the multiple characters of action to make sense of it. Of course, in our day-to-day experiences
we accept a certain level of mishap—misreading the roadmap, missing the right highway exit—and
we handle such mishaps with varying levels of success. But the utter failure of human agency that
tragedy aims to depict is something we rarely are willing to confront in our own lives.
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CLVI

How do we cope with the continual possibility for an action to radically change in character, and
consequences? How do we live knowing the frailty of our relationship to virtue?
Tragedy provides us an opportunity to notice fracture in our understanding of agency and to respond
to it. Aryeh, you suggest that art, and particularly tragic poetry, might be usefully thought of as
ritualistic: “contexts of sanctuary in which dangerous activities of such intensification and [re]ordering
can be carried out.”204 Catharsis, then, restores our faith in our own gut urge. The danger to the
intensification and reordering that occurs in tragedy is that it can paralyze us from acting in real life.
Seeing the feebleness of our own agency can instill mistrust in the value of agency. In a tragedy we are
able to acknowledge ambiguity, mistake, and human limitation, and to forgive these. Catharsis is the
means by which tragedy gets us to accept the ambiguity of our agency and returns our faith in it;
catharsis is forgiveness.
CLVII
While we unavoidably draw symbolic connections (aka meaning) between signs, ideas, events, and
objects, this category of recognition—reconciliation—often becomes habituated, such that once we
develop the appropriate cognitive muscles, we dedicate less effort to making these connections—
which makes it easier to navigate daily tasks and relationships. But mimetic connections (aka Meaning)
help us bridge entirely different rifts in our experience. In viewing a tragedy, we bear witness to the
utter frailty of agency and the inescapable ambiguity of action. Meaning deals with the instances of
recognition—reconciliation—where habit has little power. When we form Meaning, we do so across
visible rifts. In other words, to form Meaning, we must first see the rift; in tragedy mimetic action
allows us to recognize the rift and catharsis enables us to come to terms with it.
CLXVI
Our concern with identity, my mentors, deals with the cathartic grappling we do. Not only may the
objects of our world be fluid, fluctuating, and different than we trust, but so may our actions and
deeds—so may who we trust ourselves to be. And wouldn’t stability be a comfort? But these are the
risks we take in the endeavor of living. To pretend otherwise is to deny ourselves full pride in our own
courage. I hear the quavers in your voices, my mentors, and I know that your doubt is not only doubt
in language’s marvel but also doubt in how we are to live together.
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CLXVII

Hannah, you wrestle with this cathartic grappling as you seek to understand you we are—how we may
be known.
In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their
unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the
human world, while their physical identities appear without the activity
of their own in the unique shape of the body and sound of the voice.
This disclosure of “who” … can be hidden only in complete silence
and perfect passivity, but its disclosure can almost never be achieved
as a willful purpose … it is more than likely that the “who,” which
appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from
the person himself, like the daimōn in Greek religion which
accompanies each man throughout his life, always looking over his
shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters.205
Hannah, you search on our behalf to understand who are, as we live together. Remember, at the heart
of this, we are attempting to trust ourselves to live together. We are attempting to trust ourselves good
enough for one another.
CLXVIII
The fundamental condition of meaning is earnestness. Alas, we can not hope to measure earnestness
for that would, I think, destroy it.
CLXIX
Meaning relies upon our honest commitment to live with and among others. But as you know well,
my mentors—as we all know well—not all of us are earnest. Not all of us are earnest all the time.
Hannah, you say:
Error is the price we pay for truth, and semblance is the price we pay
for the wonders of appearance. Error and semblance are closely
connected phenomena; they correspond with each other.206
Likewise, the price we pay for earnestness is unearnestness. Event the most earnest among us are at
times inconsistent, fickle beings. We cannot expect of ourselves that we will not be. My mentors the
solution we must seek is not an easy one, able the come by in Q.E.D. efforts; for earnestness dies
when we seek to measure it. We must seek the important fix: we must cultivate and foster
earnestness. So, run freely Ludwig and Donald in fields of wildflowers. Strengthen the bonds that
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we love because they tenderly tether us to one another. And in the ways you look upon the world,
see earnestly. Doubt only in your hearts.
CLXX
We live in a plural world filled with the error, misstep, and diversity of myriad vantages. Embrace it.
It embraces us.
CLXXI
Partingly, I say: Language is the thorn stalk in between us and handfuls of ripening berries. It is this
in the ways we touch it, in what it does, but not by any cellular truth. It bears the fruit we seek and
navigates our progress.
We critique the thorn for the way it pricks our finger and ignore what it does for itself.
Language is no born thing. It has no DNA. It is use. Its barbs are not Fibonacci-predictable. So, it is
less the thorn stalk of blackberries and more the fragment of thorn stalk in the cardinal’s nest that
may or may not support the weight of hatchling birds.
CLXXII
If I told you this was all a poem,* would I still have your attention? Would you mistake my words?

* Poetry is perhaps playful language at its purest.

On Eager Tenterhooks

Levi, 68
Conclusion

I see philosophy as a way of grappling not with arguments for the sake of arguments. I see philosophy
as a way of grappling with how we are to live together.
It is this question of what we are willing sacrifice to live among others that is my assumptive
desire throughout this project. I will ask then: Do you want to live among others? If not, why? If so,
do you want to live among others in their full multiform variation or only among a select few decided
by you? (And YOU in all of this, if it was not otherwise clear, is singular. I am not asking if you in the
plural—somehow entailing those others with whom you feel comfortable identifying—want to live
among others. I am asking if you, limited to your lonely body, want to live among others.) So, do you?
If you do not want to live among others and are content with your blood and bone body, then
this project may not be for you. Likewise, if you are so fond of some feature or another that you
possess, such that you have decided it shall be the basis for how you select the others you wish to live
among, then, again, this project may not be for you. I am not interested in the honest misanthrope
nor in the bigot, emboldened by the swell of hatred without any prickle of conscience; and I will admit
that half of my uninterest lies in my view that there are relatively few of either sort. Instead, I am
interested in those who share an earnest desire to live among others and who struggle (complexly)
with how to do so; this project is for us.
STRUGGLE is, perhaps, too generous a term to use. STRUGGLE does not address hundreds of
years of American slavery and decades more of prison practices that are little different. It is hard to
think of the our inability (as of yet) to live among each other as merely

STRUGGLE;

somehow that

seems to diminish the horrors of what has been done, what has been suffered. Perhaps, then, I should
say that I am interested in the miserable failures of action and sentiment, the delusions that have
shaped how we live together, and the glimmering aspiration that persists for those who earnestly desire
to live among others.
Yet I am interested in the struggle, struggles: the process itself, processes themselves, of those
who earnestly desire to live among others. I cannot help but trace

STRUGGLE

to its contested roots:

thought either as descendant from the Old Norse for “ill will” (from which comes the Swedish for
“contention, strife, reluctance,” the Norwegian for “refractory,” and the Danish for “reluctantly”) or
a cognate of the German “to stumble.”207 And, in light of these senses of struggle, the word does seem
apt. We have willed wrong. We—at least too many of us—continue to be damningly reluctant. We
have stumbled and do. Particularly this metaphorical stumble seems fitting, not to diminish the
genocides, oppression, exploitation that have been the consequences but to illustrate that we are far
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from where we want to be and that our progress toward this is certainly not linear nor direct.
STRUGGLE is the best word I can find. I want to live among others—complex, confusing, kindred
people—and I have little hope that I can unless you and I—we—give proper attention to how we
struggle to do so.
I say this now, to tell you why it matters that we, our world, and meaning are held in tension.
The very fluctuations, semblances, errors, mistakes that occur in the engaging ways we move and
interact are what reassures us of our successes. We know we cast well and true because we notice
when we do not. So, these mistakes are not problems but opportunities for us to choose how we want
to be, how we want to be with each other. I began this project in the hope that I could offer a defense
for mistakes, for such a sorely undervalued strata of action. I have not had time for that yet.
What I hope I have managed to do is provide a tapestry of meaning that embrace playful language
and mistake such that it values and loves both. As flux and flickers give us our world, reality, and
meaning, so too do mistakes. We learn not rules which we follow. Rather we do in many ways and
notice the successes and failures until we establish habits. I speak to you now so well because I have
spoken so ineffectively so many times before.
I find in poetry a place for the genuine, where I may cast as strangely as I like and grin as I
make contact. What I hope we will seek in the future is a place for the genuine as we grapple with
meaning and mistake, with the tension of living among others but in different bodies. Marianne you
say so well:
I too, dislike it.
Reading it, however, with a perfect contempt for it, one discovers in
it after all, a place for the genuine.208
This place for the genuine, and the genuine strikes me. It strikes at the core of something—though I
don’t know what. It strikes very close to what I am beginning to think is the implicit condition and
conduit of language. Somehow, we connect creatively and vivaciously, particularly when our language
tests the habits of strict convention—that is, in playful language. Please, my reader, go out and cultivate
earnestness.
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